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Abstract 
 
 Whereas many studies of political participation have focused on voter behavior, none 
have addressed the effect that winning and losing has on turnout. In this study I investigate why 
chronic losers continue to participate in elections despite the fact that they have little to no 
chance of their candidate winning. A series of tests based on data gathered from the 2004 
National Annenberg Election Survey and my own survey administered through the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk system will form the basis for analysis for this study. In this research I find that 
there is reason to believe that perpetual losers participate in elections for different reasons than 
people who are chronic winners or who live within highly competitive Congressional Districts. 
This is accomplished through reviewing several motivations and beliefs that have been posited to 
influence voting behavior. I find that a false sense of competition, habitual voting behaviors, and 
strength of partisanship are significant contributors to the political participation of chronic losers. 
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Preface 
 
 
 During the week leading up to the Presidential election of 2008, my wife and I were 
discussing politics and I asked her whom she planned to vote for in the election. She just laughed 
at me and then proceeded to tell me that she had no intention of voting because it was a waste of 
time. At first I thought she was crazy because voting, to me, is one of the most important things 
in my life. Then, as I began to think about what she said, I realized that our Congressman, 
Senator, and Governor were from the opposite party of the one with which we identify. As a 
matter of fact, our party had not held a single major office other than President for the eight years 
we had lived in our house. I thought, “[w]ell, at least we’ve won the presidential election,” but 
we hadn’t. Our state had given its electoral votes to the same party for eight years as well. This is 
when I began to ponder why it is that some people who are never able to experience victory at 
the polls continue to vote while others choose not to. When I began to study political science in 
college I was introduced to Anthony Downs’ theory regarding rational voters. I knew 
immediately that the theory was flawed, even before I understood the calculus, because people 
like me existed. According to Downs I should not be participating in elections. From that point 
until the writing of this paper I have been looking for the answer to why I still feel the desire to 
vote in elections. With any luck this paper will answer that question for myself and others who 
still show up on Election Day, despite the insurmountable odds against us.  
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I 
Introduction 
 
 Many electoral districts in the United States (U.S.) show a pattern of one party winning 
the majority of elections by sizeable margins.  In fact, since 1982, thirty-six Congressional 
Districts have experienced landslide elections (elections won by a margin greater than twenty 
percent) in more than fifty percent of their elections.
1
 After the election, the winning candidate 
assumes a position in government while the supporters develop into either “individuals who 
belong to the political majority—the political ‘winners’… [or the] political minority—that is, the 
‘losers’” (Anderson and Tverdova 2001, 322). According to rational theories of voting behavior, 
we would expect this recurring pattern of one-sided victories to provide little incentive for 
supporters on either side to continue voting. These theories also suggest that extended periods of 
one-sided losses would depress voter turnout due to a sense of futility on the part of losing voters 
and a lack of competition for the winners. Psychological accounts of behavior lead us to expect 
such recurring defeats to be emotionally dispiriting and motivate a withdrawal from political life. 
At the very least, it is likely that perpetual losers would be better served placing their energy in 
political activities outside the realm of voting.
2
 
 However, despite all of this, many chronic losers continue to vote. Why, then, do citizens 
who support the persistently losing party in their district continue to vote in elections? Scholars 
have failed to investigate this question to date. Research on voters who have no prospect of 
winning in elections is important for the American notion of democracy because it will enrich 
                                                        
1 Election data gathered via CQPress for all presidential, congressional, and gubernatorial elections ranging from 
1982 through 2010.  
2 I use the terms “chronic losers” and “perpetual losers” interchangeably throughout this thesis to refer to those 
citizens who find themselves on the losing side of the vast majority of major elections over a long string of years. 
These may be thought of in a similar manner to sports fans who experience the wins and losses of their team in 
personal ways. 
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the understanding of what it is that makes people take time out of their busy lives and participate 
in the election. Furthermore, for political scientists this not only means a new area of exploration, 
but also suggests other potentially promising avenues of future research on voting behavior. 
What if other groups in society also participate in elections for different reasons or in different 
ways than modern theories or one-size-fits-all empirical studies have suggested? Also, political 
campaigns will be better equipped to motivate chronic losers to participate in elections if they 
understand what motivates these voters. If they succeed, then voter turnout may be increased and 
a previously unheard from segment of society will have a voice in elections. After all, if this 
country is to truly be a representative democracy then all of its people should make their 
opinions known so that representation does not favor any one type of citizen but instead stands 
for all citizens.   
 I expect that the motivations that cause perpetual losers to participate on Election Day are 
markedly different from the motivations of both voters in competitive districts and perpetually 
winning voters. I will test this expectation by examining what role several hypothesized 
factors—civic duty, social networks, mobilization, habit, and expressive desires—play in 
motivating citizens to vote across these different groups. In addition, I posit that the multi-level 
nature of U.S. elections—federal, state, and local—can provide an alternative motivation to vote 
even when prospects of victory are grim at one or two levels of electoral competition.  
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II 
Political Losers 
 
 Until now there have been no studies specifically to evaluate the voting decisions of 
electoral losers in particular. However, there has been some work done on how losing affects a 
person’s sense of political efficacy. Christopher Anderson and Yuliya Tverdova (2001) describe 
political efficacy as “the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact 
upon the political process…the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the 
individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change” (325). Efficacy can be broken 
down into two different types: internal efficacy and external efficacy, or political trust. “Internal 
efficacy…is based upon people’s beliefs about how much say they personally have in politics 
and about their ability to understand politics,” while external efficacy “is defined in terms of 
people’s beliefs about legislators’ interest in their views and whether legislators maintain contact 
with their constituents” (Lambert et al. 1986, 706). “When we look at the differences between 
winners and losers…we find that there is very little difference in their levels of…efficacy” 
(Anderson and Tverdova 2001, 330). Thus, in a comparative study of democracies, they 
conclude that winning or losing does not substantially affect a person’s level of political efficacy. 
Anderson and Tverdova go on to show that “on average, the internal efficacy gap between those 
in the majority and those in the minority is a negligible 1.3 percent” (330).  
However, in an analysis of the effects of winning and losing on political trust, or external 
efficacy, Christopher Anderson and Andrew LoTempio (2002) suggest that voters behave 
differently depending on the type and quantity of wins and losses they experience. They divide 
participants into four groups based on the elections voters won and lost. If the voter won in one 
type of the election but lost in the other, they were identified as partial winners and then further 
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segregated as “partial presidential winners” or “partial congressional winners” depending on 
which election it was their candidate won (344).
3
 However, if their voting resulted in winning 
both the presidential and congressional elections they were labeled “double winners” and, 
conversely, if voters lost in both elections they were cast as “double losers” (344). Anderson and 
LoTempio found that, on the issue of political trust, what mattered most to a person was whether 
or not their presidential candidate won. If this is the case, then we would expect that any voter 
who experienced a presidential loss, or a presidential loss in conjunction with multiple other 
losses, would experience a decrease in political trust. This directly contradicts Anderson and 
Tverdova who said that neither internal nor external efficacy are greatly affected by a voter’s 
wins or losses in the election. 
Thus, while there is a small literature on how electoral losses affect voters, it suffers from 
at least three weaknesses in addressing the question of this study. First, prior studies have 
examined the impact of losses on feelings of efficacy and system legitimacy, but not on political 
participation. Second, the findings with regard to efficacy are contradictory.  Third, prior studies 
only consider the immediate impact of one round of electoral losses, not the impact of persistent 
losses over a period of years or decades. This underscores the necessity for greater understanding 
of the role losing has on voters and what it means for their long-term participation in elections. A 
starting point for thinking about such research is in the modern theories regarding political 
participation and especially efforts to explain voter turnout. Through these theories it may be 
possible to identify ways in which chronic losers differ from other voters.  
 
 
                                                        
3 If the voters presidential candidate won, but congressional candidate lost they were identified as partial 
presidential winners. Conversely, if their congressional candidate won, but their presidential candidate lost they 
were categorized as partial congressional winners. 
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III 
The Theories 
 
 While research directly examining the impact of repeated electoral losses on participation 
is limited, a substantial body of work dedicated to the study of mass voting behavior may help to 
shed light on factors that shape the decision of chronic losers to participate or not. There are 
three types of theories regarding voter turnout: rational, resource, and social. Rational theories 
believe that the act of turning out at the polls on Election Day is a calculable equation and that 
for every member of society the equation is solved in the same way. Resource models, while less 
strict in their mathematics, emphasize the relatively fixed or slow-changing attributes of a 
person’s socioeconomic standing in predicting what they will do on Election Day. The most 
flexible of these models are the social models. These take account of the wider variety of 
individual experiences, beliefs, and motivations that can cause a person to be more or less likely 
to participate on Election Day. We can begin with rational theories.  
 Anthony Downs (1957) stated that every decision we make, including the decision to vote, 
is made by calculation. If the benefits of the decision outweigh the costs we go ahead, if not we 
don’t. In regards to the decision to vote, Downs supplies us with the formula V = pB – C where 
V is the decision to vote, B is the benefits a person receives from voting, C is any associated 
costs of voting, and p is the probability that the voter will cast the decisive vote in the election. 
However, this calculus fails to model actual voter participation well. The difficulty lies with the 
variable p. Because elections are collective decisions and the expected benefits are also 
collective, a person’s decision to vote hinges on the anticipated size of those benefits only to the 
extent the person expects his or her vote to affect the outcome (i.e., break a tie). Since this 
probability reduces the value of B to near zero as the number of voters grows, any costs 
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associated with the act of voting outweigh the small value of pB, leaving the conclusion that 
nobody is expected to vote.  
 In an effort to overcome the weakness of this model, William Riker and Peter Ordeshook 
(1968) added a new variable to the Downsian calculus. The new formula is V = pB – C +D, in 
which D represents the five satisfying elements that voters receive from their participation in 
elections.  These include “the satisfaction from compliance with the ethic of voting,”  “the 
satisfaction from affirming allegiance to the political system,” “the satisfaction from affirming a 
partisan preference,” “the satisfaction of deciding, going to the polls, etc.,” and “the satisfaction 
of affirming one's efficacy in the political system” (Riker and Ordeshook 1968, 28). While this 
does resolve the problem with the Downsian model that practically eliminates all voters from 
participating in elections, it does not address the root problem. All Riker and Ordeshook did was 
allow the values pB and C to continue to cancel each other out and allow D to be the entire 
determinant to whether a person votes or not. In other words, any number of individual or 
situational factors—a grandmother’s admonition, the social camaraderie of going to the polls 
with friends, a rainy day—can tip the scales between voting and not (Aldrich 1993; Rosenstone 
1982; Schlozman et al. 1995; Schier 2000). What this points out, then, is that while trying to 
explain voting behavior as a rational decision, Downs, Riker, and Ordeshook show that it is 
actually the psychological motivations that play the largest role in voters deciding to participate 
in elections. With this in mind, we can move onto resource theories. 
 Resource theories suggest that it is the things like education, income, age, and geographic 
location that impact a person’s decision to vote. Raymond Wolfinger and Steven Rosenstone 
(1980) stated that a person’s resources are one way to identify the reason some people vote while 
others do not. The resources that were used for the “classification of people is limited to 
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demographic characteristics (age, income, place of residence, and so forth) and to some 
contextual variables (such as voter registration laws)” (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 1). Of 
these characteristics, only a few have a significant impact on a person’s decision to vote. The 
most important trait was the level of education a person possesses. Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s 
study suggested, “education increases one’s capacity for understanding complex and intangible 
subjects such as politics, as well as encouraging the ethic of civic responsibility” (102). This 
finding is supported in multiple studies regarding the importance of education on voter turnout 
(Krupnikov 2009; Wattenberg 2002). In addition, Steven Finkel (1987) shows that “younger, 
more highly educated and more left-wing individuals are more likely to participate aggressively 
in politics” (458). These studies seem to make it clear that education is, in fact, important to 
determining whether or not a person will vote, but why? 
 D. Sunshine Hillygus (2005) not only confirmed that education is an exceptional 
indicator of a person’s likelihood of voting, but also expanded on the idea. First, by examining 
the effects of high scores on the SAT, “there appears no evidence that general intelligence 
influences political activity” (36). Instead, it is a person’s educational exposure to studies in the 
social sciences that “has a consistent, positive and statistically significant effect” on measures of 
participation (37). These results imply that there is a correlation between exposure to an 
education that develops civic interest and skills and a person’s likelihood to vote. Therefore, as 
in the case of rational theory, we are left with the suggestion that it is mainly one’s sense of civic 
duty that encourages voter participation. However, the relationship between education and 
participation is not infinite. The amount by which education makes a person more likely to vote 
seems to stop as soon as the level of education becomes higher than the average education of the 
other people around the voter, suggesting a role for social networks and selective mobilization, 
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topics to which we shall turn momentarily (Nie et al. 1996). Since both rational and resource 
theories point to the importance of civic duty let us move on to social theories by first examining 
civic duty. 
 Because of Riker and Ordeshook, civic duty is often associated with rational voting 
theories. For instance, Robert Salisbury (1975) suggests, “it is quite rational for people to vote 
out of a strong sense of civic duty despite a lack of effective policy alternatives, so long as the 
personal value derived from fulfilling civic duty looms larger than whatever costs the voting act 
entails” (333).  However, where rational and resource theories suggest possible reasons that 
people are able to vote, social theories seek to explain why it is that people would want to vote 
(Verba et al. 1995). In short, they focus on motivations. Many campaigns use advertising to 
increase the public’s feeling of civic duty, which in turn should make it more likely that viewers 
of the advertisement participate on Election Day (Geys 2006). Cindy Kam (2007) studied the 
ways in which citizens reacted to appeals of citizen duty from the candidates. The study’s goal 
was to “determine the extent to which a call to citizen duty in campaign discourse can encourage 
citizens to devote more cognitive effort to thinking about politics” (19). Kam found that “on 
average, subjects in the citizen-duty condition learned more, thought more, and sought 
information in a more open-minded way” (26). This conclusion, taken in tandem with the idea 
that the more information a voter is exposed to in a campaign, the more likely they are to vote, 
suggest an indirect means by which duty may prompt losers to continue to participate in 
elections, as well as the direct motivation to adhere to the social norm that suggests good citizens 
vote. Furthermore, one study suggests that high levels of civic duty had the ability to get voters 
to the polls despite explicit negative costs such as rainstorms on Election Day (Knack 1994). 
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In addition to civic duty, scholars of social, or psychological, voting behavior suggest 
other potential contributing characteristics that have a measurable impact on a person’s decision 
to participate in elections. One of these is a person’s social network and the enticements and 
pressures it creates to please others. “In an ABC-Harvard poll conducted in 1983 (Alderman 
1983), 37% of respondents—including 41% of voters—cited as a reason for voting the statement 
‘My friends and relatives almost always vote and I’d feel uncomfortable telling them I hadn’t 
voted’” (Knack 1992, 137). Furthermore, Hahrie Han (2009) found that “citizens are more likely 
to participate in politics, and more likely to intend to participate in the future, the more they talk 
to other people” (283). The social network theory of voting behavior suggests that it is due to 
social discussion that voters are motivated to vote (LeDuc et al. 2002). One of the things that 
increase a person’s ability to engage in social discussion is close relationships within a person’s 
neighborhood (Wattenberg 2002). The idea is that these relationships “provide external 
encouragement to vote, as well an enhanced sense of an election’s meaningfulness” (Teixeria 
1992, 36-37).  In addition, social groups provide voters with information that they may not have 
had access to within their own means which assists them in being more informed about the 
election and therefore more likely to participate (McClurg 2003).  
 Some scholars have suggested that as voters age their propensity to turnout increases due 
to their habit of participating on Election Day. The data from one paper suggests, “a mobilization 
campaign that stimulates 1000 people to vote in the current election produces an additional 887 
votes in elections that follow” (Gerber et al. 2003, 549). John Aldrich et al. (2011) ran a series of 
tests in which strong levels of habit were able to affect the impact that traditional resource and 
social factors had on voter participation. This suggests chronic losers may continue voting, while 
opposition seems to be insurmountable, because it is habitual. After all, if a voter were 
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encouraged to participate in elections when their district was competitive, and habit is a 
legitimate factor in determining a person’s propensity to vote, we would expect that individual to 
continue voting even after their district has become less competitive.  However, it has also been 
argued that participating in the election and losing to the majority party “may frustrate citizens 
such that they will become ever more politicized and involved in the process with the aim of 
bringing about change in a system that appears stacked against them—that is, losers may make 
their voice heard” (Anderson 2005, 51). Therefore, let us turn to information regarding 
expressive voting. 
 A further motivation that may explain perpetual losers choosing to participate despite the 
odds is to use their vote to communicate a message to other people. In one study of expressive 
voting, Thomas Piketty (1999) suggests that some voters use their electoral voice in order to 
communicate something to people about elections to come in the future. Piketty (1999) submits 
that there are at least three different channels through which ‘communicative voting’ can 
influence future elections: 
1. Voters expect mainstream parties to move towards their expressed views; 
2. Voters want to learn the strength of each candidate so as to better coordinate 
their future votes; 
3. Voters try to influence others’ opinions by expressing their political beliefs 
(169). 
  
However, in addition to Piketty, Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky (1993) point out that 
expressive voting may have nothing to do with long-term impact. Instead they show that 
occasionally people may participate “from a desire to express feelings and desires simply for the 
sake of the expression itself and without any necessary implication that the desired outcome will 
be brought about thereby” (33). While this type of voting is probably most commonly associated 
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with supporters of third parties that hold very little hope of achieving national prominence, it 
could also be a factor in members of the Democratic and Republican parties when they are 
geographically located in areas where their political opinions are not represented. One reason 
may be that, even in these areas, chronic losers are still actively pursued by election campaigns. 
This pursuit is characterized by what Steven Rosenstone and John Hansen (1993) referred to as 
mobilization. 
 Rosenstone and Hansen suggest that various political forces actively mobilize voters. 
These can include candidates running for election, mobilization from one’s own political party, 
or exposure to politically driven issues. In addition, mobilizing agents may be dependent on the 
very people they hope to motivate. Sidney Verba (1967) suggests that voters must not only be 
exposed to the things that affect their decision to vote, but when “messages are sent…they may 
or may not be received and acted upon. Much depends on the people to whom the messages are 
sent” (66). Verba goes on to show that the responsiveness of a voter can be characterized by their 
resources, motivation, structural conduciveness, and cultural conduciveness (67). If a voter is 
politically dependent for their job, for instance, they have a high likelihood of accepting 
mobilizing messages.  
 Furthermore, according to some survey data, it appears that when a minority of 
Democrats are living within a majority district of Republicans they tend be more mobilized than 
Republicans in a Democratically dominated area (Gimpel et al. 2004). In fact, “different studies 
on different elections at different times using different methods have all found that political 
mobilization—variously labeled voter contact, get-out-the-vote (GOTV), or the voter canvass—
matters” (Goldstein and Ridout 2002, 3). This concludes the reflection on the five common 
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motivational factors typically considered by social voter models. However, I would like to 
propose one more possible motivation before moving on to my own research.  
 In addition to characteristics of voters themselves, the election process itself may also be 
capable of mobilizing voters on Election Day. To begin with, elections are not held in isolation 
from each other and so each election is “oftentimes influenced by more than one electoral 
context” (Gilliam 1985, 348). Some of these contexts may be local ballot proposals, a close 
friend running for public office, or the way voters attach importance to particular elections. 
Though turnout rates suggest that voters are more attracted to “major” races such as presidential, 
gubernatorial, and congressional elections, some voters may be more deeply engaged with local 
and state affairs. 
 Furthermore, one particular aspect of context is that, in each election year, candidates at 
every level of government, from sheriff to president, contribute large sums of money on 
campaign advertising. Because of this the average voter is barraged daily with reminders to vote 
for someone, or something, on Election Day. The district attorney may have yard signs while the 
city mayor purchases a billboard. Then while watching prime time television an ad spot 
supporting a particular presidential candidate may come on. Voters may find mailers from 
candidates for the House of Representatives or Senate. While each of these items only represent 
one particular candidate or ballot proposal, they do not exist independently from one another. 
Instead, I believe that each of them increase the likelihood that a person will choose to 
participate on Election Day. 
First, each interaction with political rhetoric is a reminder to participate. Additionally, in 
conjunction with my opinion that the multi-level nature of elections is what matters, each 
exposure increases the possibility that the voter will find something they believe is worth 
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showing up for on Election Day. One example of how one election can affect voter turnout in 
other elections is illuminated by the drop off in voter turnout in years other than presidential 
elections illustrated in Figure 1.
4
  
 
Figure 1 Voter Turnout by Voter Eligible Population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 This figure is drawn from voter turnout data taken from Dr. Michael McDonald’s United States Elections Project.  
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IV 
Research Design 
 
 In this study I compare the beliefs, motivations, and behavior of chronic losers to those 
residing in competitive districts and to those who perpetually win. In order to do this I first 
categorize voters into levels of competition. Next, I evaluated how these data speak to earlier 
contradictory results regarding the political efficacy of electoral losers. Then I will examine 
turnout patterns, to see if there is any validity to the expectations of rational and psychological 
theories that voter hopelessness drives down voting in districts where one party dominates. 
Finally, I will test hypotheses about the role of several motivational factors in sustaining voter 
participation, by examining both the presence of these motivations and their explanatory power 
through the lens of district partisan competitiveness. I will be analyzing each of these steps with 
data from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) and an original survey 
administered through the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) system from March 2 through 
March 10, 2012.  
Let us begin by establishing how voters are sorted into partisan competitiveness 
categories: chronic losers, chronic winners, and all others.  Congressional Districts were 
classified using voter turnout data from the CQ Press Voting and Elections Collection. From this 
information, I created two tables: one table tracked how many losses a party experienced by a 
margin of twenty percent or more, and the other table recorded every loss regardless of margin. 
Each table marks whether Republicans or Democrats lost in each Presidential, Senatorial, House, 
and Gubernatorial election. Republican losses were then subtracted from the Democratic losses 
and divided by the total elections in that district. Therefore, a negative number identifies districts 
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where Republicans perpetually lose and a positive number indicates districts where Democrats 
perpetually lose.  
 Because the two surveys used in this study are from different periods of time, the time 
period used to determine chronic competitiveness for each is different. For the NAES survey, 
election data are from the period between 1982 and 2004. Meanwhile, the MTurk election data 
covers the period from 1982 through 2010. Finally, respondents were classified, according to 
their district’s level of competition, into roughly equally sized groups. For instance, in the NAES 
table, group one includes approximately twenty percent of the respondents and represents 
districts where Democrats win the most. Similarly, group five also includes around twenty 
percent of the respondents, but identifies districts in which Republicans dominate elections.
5
 
 The NAES survey was selected from several other major potential surveys between 2000 
and 2010 including those by the American National Election Studies, the General Social Survey, 
and the Cooperative Congressional Election Study. The 2004 NAES National Rolling Cross-
section was administered to 81,422 respondents between October 2003 and November 2004. It 
was selected for this work because it covered current theories on voter participation fairly well 
and because its large sample size ensured dispersion of many voters across diverse 
Congressional Districts. The benefit of the NAES sample size is that, as the number of 
respondents rises, it becomes easier to observe even modest differences across voters and 
districts with greater confidence. However, there are also drawbacks to the 2004 NAES. The 
questions available on the 2004 NAES survey do not address any of the modern theories 
adequately and some of the most promising questions were asked only during a portion of the 
year, undercutting some of the benefits of sample size. Therefore, I will use the MTurk survey to 
                                                        
5 See Appendix A for all tables related to this section. 
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both check the results gained from the NAES survey and to improve the depth and scope of 
concepts measured.   
MTurk is an online service in which Internet users (workers) are paid small fees to 
perform Human Intelligence Tasks (HIT's). Workers can be recruited to complete surveys 
programmed in Qualtrics in order to give random assignment to experimental conditions. The 
only requirements for respondents are a computer with Internet connection and to be at least 18 
years old. Subjects received 40 cents for completion of my 12-minute survey. The MTurk 
system, available on Amazon.com, enables researchers access to a larger and often more diverse 
(e.g., educationally, geographically) pool of respondents than is normally available for the 
standard undergraduate surveys, which tend to be limited to university students. In addition, 
MTurk offers the ability to recruit a good number of respondents in a matter of days.
6
 A similar 
study on a university campus may provide half the number of respondents in a matter of weeks 
or even months. However, in comparison to an expensive study like the 2004 NAES, the number 
of respondents available and affordable through MTurk is much lower. Yet the latter provides an 
opportunity to improve the quality and suitability of the questions for this research. By doing so 
it is possible to collect data on respondents related to each of the theories of voting behavior.
7
 
 Both the NAES and the MTurk surveys were evaluated in a similar manner. First, in 
order to illuminate the effect that competition has on political efficacy and demonstrate that voter 
fatigue is not as high as expected by rational theories in districts dominated by a single party, 
individual questions will be analyzed based on district competitiveness. Then I will examine the 
                                                        
6 My MTurk survey was able to gather 866 respondents in one week. Respondents were eliminated from analysis 
for failing to pass compliance tests. These tests included how much time the respondents took to complete the 
survey, how much time they spent on a complex ranking question, and how much time they took to answer a trigger 
question. Furthermore, if a respondents exact Congressional District could not be determined by the zip code they 
responded they were exempt from analysis.  
7 A copy of the survey administered through MTurk has been included in Appendix C. 
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way in which the hypothesized factors affect political participation based on competition. Groups 
of questions will be arranged into a series of three linear regressions (one for big losers, one for 
big winners, and one for competitive districts).  
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IV 
2004 NAES findings 
 
 In this section I will analyze respondent’s answers to a large national survey, through the 
lenses of modern voter theories, in order to focus in on the ways in which behaviors of chronic 
losers are different from other voters.
8
 However, as mentioned before, the 2004 NAES does have 
a few limitations when it comes to evaluating voter motivations, but its large sample size does 
hold the promise of greater analytical leverage over the elements it covers. Recall that Anderson 
and Tverdova (2001) stated that winning and losing had no effect on political efficacy and that 
Anderson and LoTempio (2002) showed that winning and losing did have an effect on political 
trust. The NAES offers three questions by which it is possible to evaluate theses two claims. All 
three are political efficacy questions with one being based on external efficacy, or political trust, 
and two based on internal efficacy. In Figure 2, the responses to these three questions are shown 
in three groups based on their electoral win-loss record. Because each of these questions is 
answered with either yes or no, the scale on the vertical axis represents the proportion of yes 
answers to each of the three questions. As the figure shows, Anderson and Tverdova’s (2001) 
findings are supported by the 2004 NAES, as level of competition has almost no identifiable 
difference on the three questions. In fact, the largest spread between any of the competition 
categories is less than two percent. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
8 See Appendix B for information regarding the way in which the 2004 NAES data was coded. 
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Figure 5.1 Measures of Political Efficacy  
 
 Next, I used the 2004 NAES to determine whether winning and losing has an effect on 
voter participation. As mentioned before, modern theories of voting behavior suggest that over 
the course of time the perpetual winners and losers should both experience a measureable fatigue 
in their turnout behavior. In order to measure this, four measurements of political turnout will be 
used. For the sake of thoroughness both simple losses (those elections where the voters 
experienced a loss no matter what percentage the margin was) and big losses (elections that were 
lost by a spread of at least twenty percent) are used to show the proportion of voters that 
participated. Figures 3 through 6 illustrate the answers of the respondents to questions regarding 
political turnout, categorized by the level of competition in their districts, based on twenty-two 
years of election history.  
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Figure 5.2 Proportion of Respondents Registered     
 
Figure 5.3 Proportion of Respondents who Intend to or Already did Vote in the Primary
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Figure 5.4 Proportion of Respondents who Intend to Vote in the 2004 General Election  
 
Figure 5.5 Proportion of Respondents Voted in the 2004 General Election  
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 Looking at these figures we should expect to find an inverse parabola of voter turnout 
according to both rational and psychological theories of turnout. An inverse parabola would 
demonstrate that voter fatigue occurs at both the level of perpetual winner and perpetual loser 
while turnout in competitive districts remains higher than both. However, what we find in the 
NAES is quite different than this expectation. Instead, where there is a change in voter turn out, 
levels of voter participation show a linear fatigue where the highest levels occur where the voters 
party dominates the district and, where a voters party is dominated, participation is lower. This 
occurs in all but one instance. The greatest range in voter turnout occurs among Democrats in 
Figure 2. In this case participation drops from 67% where Democrats dominate elections to 58% 
where Republicans control the district.
9
 Meanwhile, in the question regarding a voters intention 
to vote in the general election Republicans showed no change in turnout across all three 
categories of competition in both the simple loser and big loser scale. Therefore, while in most of 
the cases there is a slight drop off in participation in districts where the party is dominated, in 
none of the examples do the perpetual winners show any sign of fatigue. While this does not 
bode well for previous theories, for our purposes it is good news. Not only are chronic losers 
continuing to vote in the face of staggering opposition, they are doing so at levels near or at those 
of competitive districts. Now let us try to determine why. 
Therefore, we move to examining the ways in which the six theories of voter 
participation are reflected in the respondents to the NAES. By doing so this study may show 
what it is that motivates voters to participate regardless of the level of competitiveness in their 
district. In order to evaluate resource and social theories of participation, let us examine six 
dependent measures of voter turnout. These measures include the same four used to evaluate 
                                                        
9 Percent based on big loser data. Turnout ranges from 65% to 58% for simple losers. 
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rational theories (registered, intend to or already did vote in the primary election, intend to vote 
in the general election, voted in the general election) plus chance of voting in the primary 
election and chance of voting in the general election.  
Independent variables, referred to in Tables one through six as key variables, are 
constructed in four different ways. Attend religious service, ideological extremity, and social 
exposure at work place are taken from single questions. Both attendance of religious services and 
social exposure at work are being used in this test to account for a persons social influences by 
measuring how often that person is in contact with potential political interactions. Meanwhile, 
ideological extremity, along with strength of partisanship, is interpreted as a measure of a 
person’s expressive character.  
Strength of partisanship and percent life at residence were both constructed using the 
answers to multiple questions. Strength of partisanship is built by combining the responses to 
three individual questions about the respondent’s party identification to create a seven-point 
scale with strong republican on one end and strong democrat on the other. The party 
identification scale was then folded to create a four-point scale ranging from no party 
identification (independent) to strong party identification. This scale is what is represented in the 
term strength of partisanship. Percent life at residence is a simple calculation of a person’s age 
response divided by their response to a question asking how long the person had been living in 
their residence. The purpose of this variable is to try to evaluate how connected the respondent 
feels to their community. 
Finally, the variables discussed politics in social circle (α = 0.71) and feelings about 
candidates (α = 0.35) represent averages of the responses to multiple questions. Discussed 
politics in social circle combined responses to three questions asking how many days in the last 
 24 
week the respondent had discussed politics with a) friends or family, b) workmates, and c) 
people online. The intention of including this question is to capture the respondents mobilizing 
agents, but could also be seen as groups within a person’s social network. Feelings about 
candidates combines two questions that are nearly identical. Each question asked how favorably 
the survey taker felt about a) George W. Bush and b) John Kerry. This variable is interpreted to 
reflect the respondent’s attitude towards the multi-level nature of elections. In other words, 
regardless of the issues, does a person’s attitude about a candidate’s character encourage them to 
participate on Election Day. 
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Table 5.1 Determinants of Voter Registration (2004 NAES Survey) 
 
Competition Category 
  Big Loser Competitive Big Winner 
Key Explanatory Variables 
        Feelings About Candidates 
0.042** 
(0.011) 
0.034** 
(0.005) 
0.041** 
(0.009) 
     Strength of Partisanship 
0.097** 
(0.011) 
0.053** 
(0.005) 
0.088** 
(0.008) 
     Ideological Extremity 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
     Discussed Politics in Social Circle 
0.128** 
(0.016) 
0.105** 
(0.008) 
0.099** 
(0.012) 
     Percent Life At Residence 
0.123** 
(0.016) 
0.104** 
(0.007) 
0.133** 
(0.012) 
     Social Exposure at Workplace 
0.030** 
(0.008) 
0.022** 
(0.004) 
0.021** 
(0.006) 
     Religious Attendance 
0.061** 
(0.010) 
0.047** 
(0.005) 
0.037** 
(0.007) 
Control 
        Age 
0.373** 
(0.024) 
0.344** 
(0.012) 
0.354** 
(0.019) 
     Sex 
0.016** 
(0.006) 
0.017** 
(0.003) 
0.018** 
(0.005) 
     Education 
0.147** 
(0.013) 
0.127** 
(0.006) 
0.141** 
(0.010) 
     Income 
0.121** 
(0.016) 
0.068** 
(0.008) 
0.075** 
(0.012) 
     Married 
0.034** 
(0.007) 
0.024** 
(0.003) 
0.025** 
(0.005) 
     Black 
0.009 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
0.016* 
(0.008) 
     Minority 
-0.053** 
(0.014) 
-0.050** 
(0.007) 
-0.050** 
(0.010) 
     Hispanic 
-0.033** 
(0.015) 
-0.026** 
(0.007) 
-0.040** 
(0.011) 
 
   Adj R-squared 0.1297 0.0994 0.114 
N  8753 31118 13113 
Coeff., (Std. Err.), ^ = p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 5.2 Determinants of Intend to or Already Voted in Primary Election 
              (2004 NAES Survey) 
 
Competition Category 
  Big Loser Competitive Big Winner 
Key Explanatory Variables 
        Feelings About Candidates 
0.008 
(0.018) 
0.019* 
(0.009) 
0.027^ 
(0.014) 
     Strength of Partisanship 
0.230** 
(0.017) 
0.198** 
(0.008) 
0.193** 
(0.014) 
     Ideological Extremity 
-0.004 
(0.015) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
     Discussed Politics in Social Circle 
0.173** 
(0.026) 
0.129** 
(0.013) 
0.158** 
(0.020) 
     Percent Life At Residence 
0.125** 
(0.025) 
0.104** 
(0.013) 
0.129** 
(0.019) 
     Social Exposure at Workplace 
-0.000 
(0.013) 
0.021** 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
     Religious Attendance 
0.113** 
(0.015) 
0.096** 
(0.008) 
0.062** 
(0.012) 
Control 
        Age 
0.522** 
(0.038) 
0.540** 
(0.020) 
0.559** 
(0.030) 
     Sex 
0.020* 
(0.010) 
0.029** 
(0.005) 
0.031** 
(0.008) 
     Education 
0.057** 
(0.020) 
0.044** 
(0.010) 
0.083** 
(0.016) 
     Income 
0.013 
(0.025) 
0.054** 
(0.013) 
0.056** 
(0.020) 
     Married 
0.041** 
(0.011) 
0.026** 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
     Black 
0.051* 
(0.021) 
0.081** 
(0.010) 
0.102** 
(0.013) 
     Minority 
-0.019 
(0.022) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
0.035* 
(0.017) 
     Hispanic 
0.011 
(0.023) 
0.032** 
(0.012) 
0.025 
(0.019) 
 
   Adj R-squared 0.0876 0.0779 0.084 
 N  8508 30263 12750 
Coeff., (Std. Err.), ^ = p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 5.3 Determinants of Chance of Voting in Primary Election (2004  
               NAES Survey) 
 
Competition Category 
  Big Loser Competitive Big Winner 
Key Explanatory Variables 
        Feelings About Candidates 
0.060 
(0.038) 
0.098** 
(0.021) 
0.082** 
(0.031) 
     Strength of Partisanship 
0.365** 
(0.037) 
0.244** 
(0.019) 
0.231** 
(0.031) 
     Ideological Extremity 
-0.032 
(0.034) 
-0.032^ 
(0.018) 
-0.020 
(0.027) 
     Discussed Politics in Social Circle 
0.209** 
(0.062) 
0.194** 
(0.033) 
0.268** 
(0.049) 
     Percent Life At Residence 
0.133* 
(0.057) 
0.061* 
(0.029) 
0.125** 
(0.044) 
     Social Exposure at Workplace 
0.013 
(0.031) 
-0.003 
(0.016) 
0.001 
(0.023) 
     Religious Attendance 
0.164** 
(0.034) 
0.113** 
(0.018) 
0.058* 
(0.027) 
Control 
        Age 
0.246** 
(0.088) 
0.316** 
(0.045) 
0.402** 
(0.067) 
     Sex 
0.085** 
(0.022) 
0.087** 
(0.012) 
0.090** 
(0.018) 
     Education 
-0.038 
(0.045) 
-0.040^ 
(0.024) 
-0.036 
(0.036) 
     Income 
0.040 
(0.056) 
0.055^ 
(0.030) 
0.028 
(0.044) 
     Married 
0.048^ 
(0.025) 
0.005 
(0.013) 
0.023 
(0.020) 
     Black 
0.104* 
(0.046) 
0.125** 
(0.024) 
0.141** 
(0.028) 
     Minority 
0.000 
(0.053) 
-0.029 
(0.027) 
0.116** 
(0.042) 
     Hispanic 
0.067 
(0.059) 
0.080** 
(0.029) 
0.093* 
(0.044) 
 
   Adj R-squared 0.1394 0.1133 0.1263 
 N  1402 4632 1986 
Coeff., (Std. Err.), ^ = p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 5.4 Determinants of Intend to Vote in General Election (2004 NAES 
               Survey) 
 
Competition Category 
  Big Loser Competitive Big Winner 
Key Explanatory Variables 
        Feelings About Candidates 
0.013 
(0.012) 
0.031** 
(0.006) 
0.028** 
(0.008) 
     Strength of Partisanship 
0.077** 
(0.011) 
0.044** 
(0.005) 
0.047** 
(0.008) 
     Ideological Extremity 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.012** 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
     Discussed Politics in Social Circle 
0.084** 
(0.016) 
0.059** 
(0.007) 
0.061** 
(0.011) 
     Percent Life At Residence 
0.018 
(0.016) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.033** 
(0.011) 
     Social Exposure at Workplace 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.012^ 
(0.006) 
     Religious Attendance 
0.011 
(0.010) 
0.026** 
(0.004) 
0.017* 
(0.007) 
Control 
        Age 
0.161** 
(0.025) 
0.073** 
(0.011) 
0.099** 
(0.017) 
     Sex 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
     Education 
0.076** 
(0.013) 
0.066** 
(0.006) 
0.067** 
(0.009) 
     Income 
0.067** 
(0.017) 
0.020* 
(0.007) 
0.030** 
(0.011) 
     Married 
0.000 
(0.007) 
0.006^ 
(0.003) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
     Black 
0.025^ 
(0.014) 
0.011^ 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
     Minority 
-0.017 
(0.015) 
-0.031** 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
     Hispanic 
-0.002 
(0.015) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
 
   Adj R-squared 0.0704 0.0454 0.0559 
 N  3632 12997 5390 
Coeff., (Std. Err.), ^ = p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 5.5 Determinants of Chance of Voting in General Election (2004 NAES 
               Survey) 
 
Competition Category 
  Big Loser Competitive Big Winner 
Key Explanatory Variables 
        Feelings About Candidates 
0.047** 
(0.013) 
0.058** 
(0.006) 
0.055** 
(0.009) 
     Strength of Partisanship 
0.088** 
(0.011) 
0.056** 
(0.005) 
0.057** 
(0.008) 
     Ideological Extremity 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
     Discussed Politics in Social Circle 
0.112** 
(0.017) 
0.092** 
(0.008) 
0.090** 
(0.011) 
     Percent Life At Residence 
0.029^ 
(0.017) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
0.035** 
(0.011) 
     Social Exposure at Workplace 
0.005 
(0.009) 
0.010* 
(0.004) 
0.012^ 
(0.006) 
     Religious Attendance 
0.025* 
(0.010) 
0.032** 
(0.005) 
0.018* 
(0.007) 
Control 
        Age 
0.205** 
(0.026) 
0.135** 
(0.012) 
0.152** 
(0.018) 
     Sex 
0.007 
(0.007) 
0.010** 
(0.003) 
0.011* 
(0.004) 
     Education 
0.095** 
(0.013) 
0.081** 
(0.006) 
0.084** 
(0.009) 
     Income 
0.093** 
(0.017) 
0.037** 
(0.008) 
0.044** 
(0.012) 
     Married 
0.007 
(0.007) 
0.009* 
(0.003) 
0.009^ 
(0.005) 
     Black 
0.026^ 
(0.014) 
0.011^ 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
     Minority 
-0.038* 
(0.015) 
-0.033** 
(0.007) 
-0.016 
(0.010) 
     Hispanic 
-0.018 
(0.015) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
 
   Adj R-squared 0.1161 0.0859 0.097 
 N  3632 12995 5387 
Coeff., (Std. Err.), ^ = p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 5.6 Determinants of Voted in General Election (2004 NAES Survey) 
 
Competition Category 
  Big Loser Competitive Big Winner 
Key Explanatory Variables 
        Feelings About Candidates 
0.043* 
(0.085) 
0.034 
(0.041) 
0.042* 
(0.076) 
     Strength of Partisanship 
0.098 
(0.079) 
0.054** 
(0.035) 
0.088* 
(0.056) 
     Ideological Extremity 
-0.005 
(0.068) 
-0.003 
(0.034) 
-0.01 
(0.052) 
     Discussed Politics in Social Circle 
0.128 
(0.106) 
0.106** 
(0.049) 
0.099 
(0.075) 
     Percent Life At Residence 
0.124 
(0.107) 
0.105* 
(0.054) 
0.134 
(0.088) 
     Social Exposure at Workplace 
0.030 
(0.058) 
0.023 
(0.029) 
0.021 
(0.041) 
     Religious Attendance 
0.061 
(0.071) 
0.048** 
(0.033) 
0.037 
(0.053) 
Control 
        Age 
0.373* 
(0.170) 
0.345* 
(0.086) 
0.355* 
(0.125) 
     Sex 
0.017^ 
(0.046) 
0.018^ 
(0.022) 
0.018 
(0.034) 
     Education 
0.148 
(0.092) 
0.128** 
(0.045) 
0.141^ 
(0.064) 
     Income 
0.121* 
(0.107) 
0.069** 
(0.058) 
0.075** 
(0.080) 
     Married 
0.034 
(0.050) 
0.025 
(0.025) 
0.026 
(0.037) 
     Black 
0.010 
(0.090) 
-0.003* 
(0.047) 
0.017 
(0.057) 
     Minority 
-0.054^ 
(0.103) 
-0.051 
(0.045) 
-0.051 
(0.076) 
     Hispanic 
-0.033 
(0.125) 
-0.027 
(0.048) 
-0.041 
(0.080) 
 
   Adj R-squared 0.1211 0.1817 0.1157 
 N  171 645 268 
Coeff., (Std. Err.), ^ = p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 31 
 For each of these six measures of participation, it appears that many of the factors that 
explain voter participation are the same for big winners, losers, and competitive districts. 
Strength of partisanship seems to be the most consistent measure that distinguishes chronic 
losers from other groups. In five of the six measures of turnout strength of partisanship is 
statistically significant (99% confidence). For these five instances, voters are between three and 
ten percent more likely to participate in elections due to their strength of partisanship if they are 
big losers. This suggests that expressive desires may play a larger role in motivating chronic 
losers compared to other voters.  
In addition, there is some evidence, albeit more mixed, that age and income are strong 
predictors for perpetually losing voters. Age being significant could hint at either habit or some 
sense of civic duty. However, it is not readily apparent why wealth would make more of a 
difference to a chronic loser than other voters. As the resource theories stated, it could be a 
matter of the voter’s resources outweighing the negative costs of voting. However, making an 
educated guess at this juncture is premature for a few reasons.  
 To conclude this section, while a few variables show promise at identifying ways in 
which perpetual losers participate, this analysis does not offer the opportunity to make such a 
claim. To begin with, the questions that were used to evaluate respondents in these regressions 
were not written specifically for this study. Therefore, they do not address all of the concerns 
associated with why some voters participate in elections while others choose to stay home. 
Furthermore, the few questions that were usable from this survey provided weak measures for 
analysis. Consequently we must turn to a study designed specifically for the purpose of 
measuring why it is chronic losers continue to vote. For this purpose I have designed a survey 
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and administered it through the Amazon Mechanical Turk system. Let us now turn to the results 
of that survey.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33 
V 
MTurk Findings 
 
 In this chapter I will build on findings from the 2004 NAES by first comparing the ways 
in which winning and losing create differences in people’s behaviors. Then I will run a series of 
regression analyses in order to ascertain the factors that influence voter participation across 
competition groups. It is important to remember that while the questions asked in the MTurk 
survey are written specifically for this study, and therefore address this study’s particular needs, 
the sample size is much smaller than that of the 2004 NAES. As a sample size increases, it offers 
greater power to detect differences of any size. The NAES also is more representative of the 
population. However, even with the small sample size, there is much that can be learned from the 
MTurk survey due to the improved depth and breadth of measurement of key concepts. 
 To begin, respondents were asked for their subjective perceptions of competitiveness and 
electoral success in their district. This was accomplished by asking participants to indicate, on a 
slider ranging from zero to one hundred percent, how often the candidates they preferred won. 
As Figure 6.1 illustrates, respondents located themselves all along the scale with the highest 
concentration of answers stating that the respondent’s chosen candidates win between forty and 
sixty percent of the time. 
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Figure 6.1 Respondent’s Measure of Competiveness in Their District 
  
 However, in Figure 6.2, when the respondents are broken down by groups of competition 
based on their district history, we find that the perception of the respondents does not correspond 
with the objective measure of partisan competitiveness. Instead, we find that chronic losers, 
perpetual winners, and people that reside in competitive districts all feel that their candidates win 
about the same amount of the time. This suggests that chronic losers may have a self-inflated 
sense of competition within their district.
10
 In addition, perpetual winners have a deflated sense 
of victory given that their preferred candidate wins by a landslide the majority of the time. If this 
is the case, then what we are seeing is that, for some reason, voters in landslide districts believe 
                                                        
10 It is also possible that the equal perception of competition is due to data or measurement problems. If respondents 
misreported their zip codes then their answers would be compared with the wrong district. Furthermore, it be that 
because my basis for actual levels of competition are only based on major elections, I am missing a considerable 
component of winning and losing in very localized elections (ie. school board, mayor, city executive, etc.). Finally, 
it is possible that an error occurred while I was coding the survey data.  
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
0% to 20% 20% to 40% 40% to 60% 60% to 80% 80% to 100% 
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
R
e
sp
o
n
d
e
n
ts
 
Percent of the time respondents feel their candidates win 
 35 
that their district is competitive. This could be one reason why we did not see any strong 
differences between the three groups in the 2004 NAES data. After all, if all three groups believe 
themselves to reside in a competitive district, then all three would be expected to behave in a 
similar manner. Let us see if all three categories of competition behave the same way in this 
study as well. 
 
Figure 6.2 Subjective Perceptions of Competitiveness by Objective Competition Category 
 
 This study again measured internal political efficacy in order to compare to earlier 
findings. Remember that the 2004 NAES results suggest that winning and losing had no 
significant impact across three measures of political efficacy.  In this study, it appears that there 
may be some effect on efficacy after all. When respondents were asked to agree or disagree with 
the statement “I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the important issues facing our 
country” the distance between low and high is around five percent (p < 0.1) between perpetual 
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politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what 
is going on” the spread is quite large. Perpetual losers were nearly nine percentage points higher 
(p < .01) in their average responses than people in competitive districts. Furthermore, the average 
responses of perpetual losers were four percent higher (p > .1) than perpetual winners. This 
implies that being in a lopsided district as opposed to a competitive district lowers one’s sense of 
political efficacy and that effect is greater, although not significantly, for the losers in those one-
sided districts. If there is a difference in political efficacy between this study and the 2004 
NAES, perhaps we will find a difference in voter turnout as well.   
 
Figure 6.3  Measures of Political Efficacy  
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if voter fatigue occurs in the manner that rational and psychological theories suggest then we 
would expect to see an inverse parabola with the two non-competitive groups reporting 
significantly lower turnout levels than the competitive group. In five out of the twenty 
measurements we do find these inverse parabolas. One of these five measurements is turnout 
among Democrats (BL) in the 2008 general election. The other four occur among Republicans, 
including for voter registration (SL), intention to vote in the 2012 general election (SL), and 
turnout in the 2008 and 2010 general elections (BL). However, like the 2004 NAES results, most 
of the turnout results show minimal fluctuations between the three groups (6.31% is the average 
distance between furthest points).  
 
Figure 6.4 Proportion of Respondents Registered 
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Figure 6.5 Proportion of Respondents who Intend to Vote in 2012 
     
Figure 6.6 Proportion of Respondents who Voted in 2008 
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Figure 6.7 Proportion of Respondents who Voted in 2010 
 
 
 Before moving on to a regression analysis examining the predictors of voter turnout, it 
may be useful to consider how, if at all, the motivations and perceptions of losers differ in the 
first place. For this purpose, Figure 6.8 illustrates five scales that are derived from thirteen 
questions in the MTurk survey. These scales are shown because they represent the instances 
where the answers of perpetual losers were significantly different (at least p < 0.1) from both 
chronic winners and people in competitive districts.
11
 The first scale measures the extent to 
which participants believe that elections matter (α = 0.62).12 The next taps enjoyment from the 
act of voting itself, based on a single branched question asking how strongly respondents like or 
                                                        
11 Since the focus of this study is on the voting behaviors of chronic losers results in which chronic losers are not 
significantly different are not reported. These results are available from the author upon request. 
12 The scale combines answers from three questions: (1) are there differences between Republicans and Democrats, 
do you feel that elections have an affect on the issues, and do you feel your vote makes a difference.  
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dislike the process of voting. The next two scales measure the ways in which society can 
influence voter behavior. The social norms scale (α = 0.82) taps into the general normative 
pressures a respondent may feel at having failed to live up to notions of civic duty or similar 
expectations.
13
 The scale of social pressures (α = 0.59) measures the more personal and direct 
social pressures stemming from the desire to please (or not disappoint) someone the respondent 
knows.
14
 Finally, the last scale measures the desire to have one’s voice counted (α = 0.74), to 
capture at least one form of expressive voting behavior.
15
  
Figure 6.8 shows the means of these five scales by competition category. For three of 
these scales, perpetual losers have a significantly lower (p < .05) average response than perpetual 
winners or respondents from competitive districts.
16
 Two of these scales relate to the benefits and 
costs associated with rational voter theory. According to rational voter theory since the perpetual 
losers benefit is lower and the cost reduction is lower (resulting in higher costs) the chronic loser 
is less likely to vote. Therefore, if rational voter theory holds for chronic losers then respondents 
beliefs that elections matter (benefit) and the extent to which they like the process of voter 
participation on Election Day (cost reduction) should show up as negative coefficients in the 
regression analysis. In addition to these two scales, Figure 6.8 reports that chronic losers stated 
that they have a lower desire to express their opinions than the other two groups. This may 
indicate recognition on the part of perpetual losers that it is unlikely that either their short term or 
                                                        
13 Scale of Social Norms represents: are you embarrassed if people find out you didn’t vote, and if I miss an 
election, I don’t care if other people know I didn’t vote. 
14 Scale of Social Pressures represents: I never feel pressured to vote just to make other people happy, when 
someone I know asks me to vote, I don’t feel any added pressure to do so, and there are times when I turn out to vote 
mainly to please someone I care about. 
15 Variable represents: if I know my side will lose the election, I see voting as pointless… and I want to cast my 
vote and make sure my views are counted, even if I know I am on the losing side. 
16 The three scales are belief that elections matter, impact of liking the process, and scale of desire to have voice 
counted. 
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long term goals will come to fruition. In other words, there is a sense of giving up on the part of 
these respondents.  
Finally, Figure 6.8 shows two measures of social influence on chronic losers. In the two 
variables regarding the influence of social networks the mean response of perpetual losers is 
even with that of competitive districts and statistically higher (p < .05) than the responses of 
perpetual winners. This means that chronic losers care more about the way their political 
behavior makes them look both to society as a whole and to their close social network (friends or 
family). However, whether or not this affects their decision to ultimately participate on Election 
Day is yet to be seen. It could be that chronic losers feel more guilty or more pressured by their 
social groups, but fail to do anything about it for some reason. Let us now turn to a different type 
of question that respondents encountered in this survey. 
 In order to further examine what is important to people at different levels of competition, 
the MTurk survey included a ranking question.  In this question (see Table 6.1), respondents 
were asked to rank nine statements based on which considerations are more or less important 
when they decide whether they will turn out to vote. It is striking that all three groups ranked the 
options nearly identically with the exception of one selection. Thinking back to respondents’ 
subjective perceptions of how often their own candidates won and how chronic losers identified 
their districts as competitive, it is interesting to see that chronic losers rank highest, out of the 
three groups, on the consideration of whether their vote will determine the outcome of the 
election. It appears that the group’s perception that their district is competitive is strong enough 
to impact their factors for voting. After all, they represent voters that lose the most by margins of 
twenty percent or more and yet they perceive their district to be competitive and they report that 
they vote because they believe that their vote will determine the outcome of the election. 
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Figure 6.8 Mean of Voter Belief and Motivation Scales by Objective Competition Level 
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Table 6.1 Mean Subjective Ranking of Motivation Importance by Objective Competition Level 
Big Loser Competitive Big Winner 
Express support for a candidate 
or cause 
0.800 
(0.21) 
Express support for a candidate 
or cause 
0.816 
(0.21) 
Express support for a candidate 
or cause 
0.810 
(0.22) 
Believe the outcome of the 
election will affect you 
0.759 
(0.24) 
Believe the outcome of the 
election will affect you 
0.743 
(0.23) 
Believe the outcome of the 
election will affect you 
0.721 
(0.22) 
Believe your vote will 
determine the outcome of the 
election 
0.646 
(0.27) 
Desire to fulfill civic duty 0.655 
(0.27) 
Desire to fulfill civic duty 0.691 
(0.28) 
Desire to fulfill civic duty 0.622 
(0.28) 
Believe your vote will determine 
the outcome of the election 
0.598 
(0.28) 
Believe your vote will 
determine the outcome of the 
election 
0.587 
(0.26) 
Ease of participating in election 0.442 
(0.26) 
Party loyalty 0.472 
(0.29) 
Party loyalty 0.435 
(0.30) 
Party loyalty 0.417 
(0.29) 
Ease of participating in election 0.423 
(0.27) 
Ease of participating in election 0.416 
(0.27) 
Participate because I am 
encouraged by someone 
0.301 
(0.24) 
Participate because I am 
encouraged by someone 
0.292 
(0.23) 
Participate because I am 
encouraged by someone 
0.314 
(0.23) 
Participate to make family or 
friends happy 
0.257 
(0.25) 
I derives pleasure from the 
election process 
0.254 
(0.26) 
I derives pleasure from the 
election process 
0.269 
(0.25) 
I derives pleasure from the 
election process 
0.255 
(0.24) 
Participate to make family or 
friends happy 
0.246 
(0.24) 
Participate to make family or 
friends happy 
0.258 
(0.26) 
Mean (Std. Err.)      
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Now that we have examined the ways in which respondents answered the survey 
questions we can now turn to the regression analysis of four measures of voter participation from 
the MTurk survey, in order to see more objectively what factors predict electoral involvement in 
each competition category. In this analysis, we will examine fifteen key independent variables, 
and seven control variables. Many of the variables are scales derived from multiple questions on 
the MTurk survey.
17
 Rather than include every question in the survey as a variable in these 
regressions, scales were created to improve the efficiency of the regressions and provide more 
robust measurement of the concepts of interest. The four dependent measures include voter 
registration, intention of participating in the 2012 election, perceived chance of participating in 
the 2012 election (0 to 100%), and past voter turnout (α = 0.84).18 
 
                                                        
17 Specific information regarding the scaling of these variables can be found in Appendix C. 
18 Past voter turnout is a combination of respondent answers to: did you vote in 2008, did you vote in 2010, and 
how often in the past five years did you vote. 
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Table 6.2 Determinants of Voter Registration (2012 MTurk Survey) 
 
Competition Category 
  Big Loser Competitive Big Winner 
Key Explanatory Variables 
        Index of Mobilization 0.001 
(0.030) 
0.016 
(0.023) 
0.027 
(0.022) 
     Elections Matter 0.045 
(0.215) 
0.145 
(0.204) 
0.241 
(0.151) 
     Scale of Costs 0.251 
(0.203) 
0.003 
(0.192) 
-0.322* 
(0.159) 
     Scale of Local Elections -0.035 
(0.245) 
0.076 
(0.214) 
-0.060 
(0.208) 
     Political Discussion 0.139 
(0.261) 
0.252 
(0.250) 
0.027 
(0.227) 
     Impact of Liking the Process of Voting -0.006 
(0.159) 
0.049 
(0.162) 
-0.137 
(0.130) 
     Scale of Civic Duty 0.201 
(0.143) 
0.074 
(0.116) 
0.014 
(0.108) 
     Scale of Social Norms 0.177 
(0.311) 
0.172 
(0.254) 
0.043 
(0.233) 
     Habit 0.730** 
(0.202) 
0.218 
(0.150) 
0.242^ 
(0.127) 
     Index of Expressive Activity -0.065 
(0.149) 
-0.049 
(0.118) 
-0.139 
(0.112) 
     Scale of Partisan Commitment -0.067 
(0.173) 
-0.050 
(0.153) 
-0.187 
(0.137) 
     Respondent Voice Counts 0.083 
(0.176) 
0.253 
(0.175) 
0.432** 
(0.157) 
     Scale of Social Pressures 0.379 
(0.279) 
-0.228 
(0.216) 
0.623** 
(0.230) 
     Voting with Friends and Family is Fun 0.188 
(0.164) 
-0.198 
(0.137) 
0.444** 
(0.114) 
Control 
        Percent of Life Spent at Current Address -0.074 
(0.241) 
0.157 
(0.178) 
-0.209 
(0.207) 
     Age 0.017 
(0.017) 
-0.021 
(0.015) 
0.021^ 
(0.012) 
     Sex -0.035 
(0.075) 
-0.062 
(0.066) 
-0.062 
(0.057) 
     Education 0.221 
(0.177) 
0.431** 
(0.149) 
0.347* 
(0.145) 
     Income 0.044 
(0.140) 
0.109 
(0.138) 
-0.149 
(0.106) 
     Minority 0.030 
(0.082) 
-0.067 
(0.082) 
-0.237** 
(0.080) 
     Unemployed 0.054 
(0.105) 
-0.019 
(0.097) 
-0.040 
(0.073) 
 
   Adj R-squared 0.2161 0.1674 0.324 
 N  135 155 153 
Coeff., (Std. Err.), ^ = p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 6.3 Determinants of Intention to Vote in 2012 Election (2012 MTurk Survey) 
 
Competition Category 
  Big Loser Competitive Big Winner 
Key Explanatory Variables 
        Index of Mobilization 0.035 
(0.025) 
0.025 
(0.019) 
0.026 
(0.019) 
     Elections Matter 0.534** 
(0.176) 
0.182 
(0.169) 
0.219^ 
(0.127) 
     Scale of Costs -0.168 
(0.166) 
0.088 
(0.159) 
-0.084 
(0.134) 
     Scale of Local Elections -0.120 
(0.201) 
0.040 
(0.178) 
0.036 
(0.174) 
     Political Discussion 0.272 
(0.213) 
0.263 
(0.208) 
0.461* 
(0.190) 
     Impact of Liking the Process of Voting 0.230^ 
(0.130) 
-0.039 
(0.134) 
-0.151 
(0.109) 
     Scale of Civic Duty -0.017 
(0.119) 
0.124 
(0.096) 
0.076 
(0.091) 
     Scale of Social Norms -0.310 
(0.256) 
0.034 
(0.211) 
-0.200 
(0.196) 
     Habit 0.371* 
(0.165) 
0.068 
(0.125) 
-0.261* 
(0.107) 
     Index of Expressive Activity 0.120 
(0.127) 
-0.163^ 
(0.098) 
-0.099 
(0.094) 
     Scale of Partisan Commitment -0.088 
(0.142) 
0.209 
(0.127) 
0.027 
(0.115) 
     Respondent Voice Counts 0.182 
(0.144) 
0.558** 
(0.146) 
0.478** 
(0.132) 
     Scale of Social Pressures -0.062 
(0.228) 
0.037 
(0.179) 
0.513** 
(0.193) 
     Voting with Friends and Family is Fun 0.084 
(0.135) 
0.027 
(0.113) 
0.196* 
(0.096) 
Control 
        Percent of Life Spent at Current Address -0.521** 
(0.197) 
0.129 
(0.148) 
0.250 
(0.174) 
     Age -0.008 
(0.014) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
     Sex -0.121^ 
(0.061) 
-0.048 
(0.055) 
-0.067 
(0.048) 
     Education -0.070 
(0.145) 
0.061 
(0.123) 
0.408** 
(0.122) 
     Income -0.043 
(0.115) 
0.081 
(0.115) 
-0.174^ 
(0.089) 
     Minority 0.057 
(0.067) 
-0.013 
(0.068) 
-0.046 
(0.067) 
     Unemployed 0.296** 
(0.085) 
-0.039 
(0.081) 
0.045 
(0.061) 
 
   Adj R-squared 0.3585 0.2748 0.344 
 N  134 155 153 
Coeff., (Std. Err.), ^ = p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 6.4 Determinants of Chance of Voting in 2012 Election (2012 MTurk Survey) 
 
Competition Category 
  Big Loser Competitive Big Winner 
Key Explanatory Variables 
        Index of Mobilization 0.030 
(0.020) 
0.010 
(0.018) 
0.021 
(0.018) 
     Elections Matter 0.431** 
(0.145) 
0.203 
(0.155) 
0.247* 
(0.122) 
     Scale of Costs -0.129 
(0.136) 
-0.041 
(0.145) 
-0.042 
(0.133) 
     Scale of Local Elections -0.046 
(0.169) 
0.137 
(0.163) 
0.081 
(0.170) 
     Political Discussion 0.258 
(0.182) 
0.249 
(0.190) 
0.444* 
(0.182) 
     Impact of Liking the Process of Voting 0.128 
(0.107) 
-0.046 
(0.123) 
-0.134 
(0.104) 
     Scale of Civic Duty 0.023 
(0.099) 
0.172^ 
(0.088) 
0.092 
(0.088) 
     Scale of Social Norms -0.340 
(0.209) 
0.019 
(0.193) 
-0.173 
(0.186) 
     Habit 0.411** 
(0.136) 
0.153 
(0.114) 
-0.024 
(0.102) 
     Index of Expressive Activity 0.135 
(0.104) 
-0.104 
(0.090) 
-0.086 
(0.090) 
     Scale of Partisan Commitment -0.011 
(0.118) 
0.204^ 
(0.116) 
0.082 
(0.110) 
     Respondent Voice Counts 0.348** 
(0.118) 
0.457** 
(0.133) 
0.429** 
(0.126) 
     Scale of Social Pressures -0.121 
(0.187) 
0.028 
(0.164) 
0.383* 
(0.184) 
     Voting with Friends and Family is Fun 0.070 
(0.110) 
-0.011 
(0.104) 
0.211* 
(0.092) 
Control 
        Percent of Life Spent at Current Address -0.402* 
(0.161) 
0.109 
(0.135) 
0.038 
(0.168) 
     Age -0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
     Sex -0.048 
(0.050) 
-0.041 
(0.050) 
-0.053 
(0.047) 
     Education 0.019 
(0.119) 
0.059 
(0.113) 
0.402** 
(0.117) 
     Income -0.005 
(0.095) 
0.149 
(0.105) 
-0.169^ 
(0.086) 
     Minority 0.074 
(0.056) 
-0.013 
(0.062) 
-0.066 
(0.064) 
     Unemployed 0.213** 
(0.070) 
-0.058 
(0.074) 
0.080 
(0.060) 
 
   Adj R-squared 0.5367 0.3855 0.4053 
 N  133 155 150 
Coeff., (Std. Err.), ^ = p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 6.5 Determinants of Past Voter Turnout (2012 MTurk Survey) 
 
Competition Category 
  Big Loser Competitive Big Winner 
Key Explanatory Variables 
        Index of Mobilization 0.006 
(0.020) 
0.018 
(0.016) 
0.038* 
(0.018) 
     Elections Matter 0.136 
(0.139) 
0.325* 
(0.144) 
0.228^ 
(0.124) 
     Scale of Costs -0.112 
(0.129) 
-0.125 
(0.135) 
-0.051 
(0.130) 
     Scale of Local Elections 0.353* 
(0.156) 
0.312* 
(0.151) 
0.101 
(0.169) 
     Political Discussion 0.013 
(0.166) 
0.251 
(0.176) 
0.295 
(0.184) 
     Impact of Liking the Process of Voting -0.025 
(0.102) 
0.042 
(0.114) 
-0.032 
(0.106) 
     Scale of Civic Duty 0.087 
(0.095) 
0.225** 
(0.082) 
0.147^ 
(0.088) 
     Scale of Social Norms 0.114 
(0.198) 
0.028 
(0.179) 
-0.026 
(0.190) 
     Habit 0.464** 
(0.131) 
0.227* 
(0.106) 
0.489** 
(0.104) 
     Index of Expressive Activity 0.068 
(0.096) 
0.043 
(0.083) 
-0.055 
(0.091) 
     Scale of Partisan Commitment -0.059 
(0.112) 
-0.043 
(0.108) 
-0.160 
(0.112) 
     Respondent Voice Counts 0.498** 
(0.113) 
0.097 
(0.124) 
0.317* 
(0.128) 
     Scale of Social Pressures 0.062 
(0.178) 
-0.215 
(0.152) 
0.159 
(0.187) 
     Voting with Friends and Family is Fun -0.212* 
(0.105) 
0.006 
(0.096) 
0.093 
(0.093) 
Control 
        Percent of Life Spent at Current Address -0.208 
(0.154) 
-0.038 
(0.126) 
0.034 
(0.168) 
     Age 0.002 
(0.011) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.018^ 
(0.010) 
     Sex 0.034 
(0.048) 
0.032 
(0.047) 
-0.016 
(0.047) 
     Education 0.400** 
(0.113) 
0.342** 
(0.105) 
0.386** 
(0.119) 
     Income 0.042 
(0.090) 
-0.055 
(0.097) 
-0.270** 
(0.086) 
     Minority -0.083 
(0.053) 
0.038 
(0.058) 
-0.175** 
(0.065) 
     Unemployed 0.022 
(0.067) 
0.042 
(0.069) 
0.042 
(0.059) 
 
   Adj R-squared 0.6241 0.5423 0.5205 
 N  134 155 152 
Coeff., (Std. Err.), ^ = p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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 The strongest predictor across all four measurements of voter participation is habit. The 
variable habit (α = 0.64) is a combination of the questions asking how much respondents agree or 
disagree with the following statements: (1) “every time a new election comes around, it feels like 
I have to figure out where to go and what to do, almost like it’s my first time”; (2) “the process 
of going to the polls and filling out a ballot is so familiar to me, I feel like I could do it in my 
sleep.” For perpetual losers we find that habit is statistically significant (for three outcomes, p < 
.01, and the fourth, p < .05) in each case and has a coefficient more than twice as large as 
competitive districts and chronic winners in three of the four tables. However, these habitually 
voting chronic losers were not born habitual voters. At one time they had to vote for non-habitual 
reasons. They could have lived in another district that was competitive and then moved into their 
one sided district. This theory is supported by the strong (p < .05 and p < .01) negative impact 
that the percent of ones life in their home has on voter participation in two of the tests. Also these 
habitual voters could be remnants from a time when the district was more competitive and 
therefore established their pattern of voting before becoming a chronic loser. However, there is 
one other variable that, while it makes a weaker showing in the analysis, may contribute to 
perpetual losers participating and, thus, implementing a habit of involvement. 
 In two of the four measures of participation the importance of elections is significantly 
higher for chronic losers than for the other two groups (p < .01). Recall that, as seen in Figure 
6.8, the mean level of such beliefs was lower among chronic losers than among perpetual 
winners and people in competitive districts. However, it appears that these beliefs may be more 
important in influencing chronic loser participation. This suggests that, for some reason, 
perpetual losers perceive a benefit associated with their participation. Behavior like this implies 
rational voting tendencies. However, in order to accept this, given the trouble that rational voter 
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theory has encountered, it is important to recall what we learned about the effects of winning and 
losing on chronic losers perception of competition. Recall that the p value in Downs’ theory 
represented the likelihood that the voter will cast the decisive vote. Therefore, the more 
competitive the voter perceives their district to be the higher p will become. Given that chronic 
losers still perceive their districts as competitive, multiplied by the perceived benefit that chronic 
losers believe the election will provide them, it is possible that the costs associated with voting 
will be overcome and the chronic loser will vote. 
 Finally, I would like to point out a few variables that show some signs of being 
significant, but are consistent for all three groups of competition. Age and education both are two 
such measurements of voter participation. In addition, they exemplify why it is important to 
include control measurements in addition to hypothesized key measurements. Furthermore, the 
desire to have one’s voice heard as a measure of political participation is significant in at least 
one competition category in all four of the voter turnout categories. Many of the measures of the 
MTurk analysis are still weak in the same way they were for the 2004 NAES. However, there is 
some reason to believe that should the large sample from the 2004 NAES be combined with the 
subject specific variables from the MTurk survey differences between chronic losers and other 
people would be demonstrated more robustly.  
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VIII 
Conclusions and Discussion 
 
 
 Throughout this study I have been trying to identify ways in which long-term winning 
and losing affects voting behavior. Although neither of the two test studies was optimal, I was 
able to leverage the strengths of each to arrive at some interesting implications that merit further 
study. First, doubt continues over whether losing has an effect on political efficacy. Because the 
measures of efficacy in the 2004 NAES were some of the items sufficiently written and the 
sample is more representative than the MTurk study I would tend to trust the results of that test 
more. Similarly, since the measures of voter turnout have no reason to be suspect, I stand by the 
argument that long-term one-sided districts create minimal drop-offs in voter turnout, contrary to 
what rational and psychological theories would lead one to expect.  
 I believe that part of this is due to the fact that regardless of what the reality is, most 
voters believe that their candidate has a fair chance of winning. After all, why should a decline in 
voter participation occur if nobody believes that they are winning or losing most of the time? 
Finally, there is evidence to suggest that habitual voting and strong partisan relationships 
contribute more to chronic losers participating in elections. It may be possible that the reason 
these are stronger predictors of turnout for perpetual losers is because they do not require chronic 
losers to acknowledge the reality of competition within their district.  
 Possible strings of research that could come from these findings are investigations into 
the development of false impressions of competition and the ways in which these impressions 
create habitual voting practices. Furthermore, it would be exciting to see the ways that other 
groups within the mass population differ in behaviors that affect voter participation. I think it is 
time that political scientists stop trying to identify predictors of voting behavior for voters as one 
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body and, instead, acknowledge that there are different groups that exist within the eligible 
population that participate for different reasons. Perhaps by examining these groups it will be 
possible to better encourage everyone to vote on Election Day and begin to tackle the extremely 
low voter participation rate in the United States.  
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Appendix A 
 
NAES District Big Loser % NAES District Big Loser % 
Alabama District 1 0.276 California District 21 0.345 
Alabama District 2 0.241 California District 22 0.207 
Alabama District 3 -0.241 California District 23 -0.103 
Alabama District 4 -0.207 California District 24 -0.207 
Alabama District 5 -0.345 California District 25 0.000 
Alabama District 6 0.034 California District 26 -0.310 
Alabama District 7 -0.379 California District 27 -0.207 
Arizona District 1 0.433 California District 28 -0.138 
Arizona District 2 -0.100 California District 29 -0.414 
Arizona District 3 0.533 California District 30 -0.345 
Arizona District 4 0.500 California District 31 -0.379 
Arizona District 5 0.467 California District 32 -0.379 
Arizona District 6 0.320 California District 33 -0.069 
Arizona District 7 0.250 California District 34 -0.345 
Arizona District 8 0.350 California District 35 -0.069 
Arkansas District 1 -0.400 California District 36 -0.069 
Arkansas District 2 -0.267 California District 37 -0.103 
Arkansas District 3 0.200 California District 38 0.000 
Arkansas District 4 -0.267 California District 39 0.276 
California District 1 -0.241 California District 40 0.345 
California District 2 0.276 California District 41 0.276 
California District 3 -0.172 California District 42 0.138 
California District 4 0.000 California District 43 0.103 
California District 5 -0.379 California District 44 -0.069 
California District 6 -0.379 California District 45 0.310 
California District 7 -0.414 California District 46 0.000 
California District 8 -0.379 California District 47 0.125 
California District 9 -0.379 California District 48 0.208 
California District 10 -0.207 California District 49 0.000 
California District 11 0.000 California District 50 -0.208 
California District 12 -0.103 California District 51 0.167 
California District 13 -0.414 California District 52 0.167 
California District 14 -0.069 California District 53 -0.105 
California District 15 -0.207 Colorado District 1 -0.276 
California District 16 -0.414 Colorado District 2 -0.103 
California District 17 -0.103 Colorado District 3 0.172 
California District 18 -0.379 Colorado District 4 0.276 
California District 19 0.207 Colorado District 5 0.414 
California District 20 0.034 Colorado District 6 0.379 
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NAES District Big Loser % NAES District Big Loser % 
Colorado District 7 0.105 Georgia District 8 -0.267 
Connecticut District 1 -0.448 Georgia District 9 -0.067 
Connecticut District 2 -0.207 Georgia District 10 -0.100 
Connecticut District 3 -0.379 Georgia District 11 -0.040 
Connecticut District 4 0.172 Georgia District 12 -0.100 
Connecticut District 5 -0.034 Georgia District 13 -0.100 
Deleware District 1 -0.067 Idaho District 1 0.414 
Florida District 1 0.036 Idaho District 2 0.379 
Florida District 2 -0.321 Illinois District 1 -0.414 
Florida District 3 -0.185 Illinois District 2 -0.414 
Florida District 4 0.071 Illinois District 3 -0.379 
Florida District 5 0.000 Illinois District 4 -0.207 
Florida District 6 0.107 Illinois District 5 -0.345 
Florida District 7 0.000 Illinois District 6 0.310 
Florida District 8 0.357 Illinois District 7 -0.414 
Florida District 9 0.286 Illinois District 8 -0.069 
Florida District 10 0.286 Illinois District 9 -0.414 
Florida District 11 -0.250 Illinois District 10 0.276 
Florida District 12 0.259 Illinois District 11 -0.103 
Florida District 13 0.321 Illinois District 12 -0.069 
Florida District 14 0.107 Illinois District 13 0.310 
Florida District 15 0.214 Illinois District 14 0.310 
Florida District 16 0.074 Illinois District 15 0.241 
Florida District 17 -0.393 Illinois District 16 0.207 
Florida District 18 0.107 Illinois District 17 -0.172 
Florida District 19 -0.357 Illinois District 18 0.207 
Florida District 20 -0.217 Illinois District 19 -0.241 
Florida District 21 0.261 Indiana District 1 -0.143 
Florida District 22 0.174 Indiana District 2 0.179 
Florida District 23 -0.261 Indiana District 3 0.214 
Florida District 24 0.056 Indiana District 4 0.357 
Florida District 25 0.056 Indiana District 5 0.429 
Georgia District 1 -0.067 Indiana District 6 0.571 
Georgia District 2 -0.333 Indiana District 7 0.464 
Georgia District 3 -0.100 Indiana District 8 0.148 
Georgia District 4 -0.233 Indiana District 9 -0.036 
Georgia District 5 -0.433 Iowa District 1 0.379 
Georgia District 6 0.100 Iowa District 2 0.207 
Georgia District 7 -0.167 Iowa District 3 0.069 
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NAES District Big Loser % NAES District Big Loser % 
Iowa District 4 0.000 Michigan District 1 -0.267 
Iowa District 5 0.414 Michigan District 2 0.267 
Kansas District 1 0.793 Michigan District 3 0.133 
Kansas District 2 0.414 Michigan District 4 0.300 
Kansas District 3 0.586 Michigan District 5 -0.100 
Kansas District 4 0.310 Michigan District 6 0.133 
Kentucky District 1 -0.276 Michigan District 7 -0.067 
Kentucky District 2 -0.207 Michigan District 8 -0.167 
Kentucky District 3 -0.276 Michigan District 9 0.033 
Kentucky District 4 0.069 Michigan District 10 -0.033 
Kentucky District 5 0.241 Michigan District 11 0.167 
Kentucky District 6 0.069 Michigan District 12 -0.200 
Louisiana District 1 0.207 Michigan District 13 -0.267 
Louisiana District 2 -0.483 Michigan District 14 -0.367 
Louisiana District 3 -0.276 Michigan District 15 -0.367 
Louisiana District 4 -0.172 Minnesota District 1 -0.036 
Louisiana District 5 -0.167 Minnesota District 2 0.143 
Louisiana District 6 0.138 Minnesota District 3 0.464 
Louisiana District 7 -0.400 Minnesota District 4 -0.250 
Maine District 1 -0.100 Minnesota District 5 -0.321 
Maine District 2 0.100 Minnesota District 6 -0.036 
Maryland District 1 -0.172 Minnesota District 7 -0.071 
Maryland District 2 -0.034 Minnesota District 8 -0.321 
Maryland District 3 -0.583 Mississippi District 1 0.233 
Maryland District 4 -0.448 Mississippi District 2 0.033 
Maryland District 5 -0.586 Mississippi District 3 0.133 
Maryland District 6 -0.310 Mississippi District 4 0.100 
Maryland District 7 -0.655 Mississippi District 5 0.172 
Maryland District 8 -0.138 Missouri District 1 -0.250 
Massachusetts District 1 -0.233 Missouri District 2 0.321 
Massachusetts District 2 -0.633 Missouri District 3 -0.107 
Massachusetts District 3 -0.500 Missouri District 4 -0.214 
Massachusetts District 4 -0.600 Missouri District 5 -0.179 
Massachusetts District 5 -0.533 Missouri District 6 0.107 
Massachusetts District 6 -0.467 Missouri District 7 0.393 
Massachusetts District 7 -0.633 Missouri District 8 0.321 
Massachusetts District 8 -0.633 Missouri District 9 0.179 
Massachusetts District 9 -0.633 Montana District 1 -0.143 
Massachusetts District 10 -0.533 Nebraska District 1 0.516 
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NAES District Big Loser % NAES District Big Loser % 
Nebraska District 2 0.323 New York District 17 -0.552 
Nebraska District 3 0.516 New York District 18 -0.483 
Nevada District 1 -0.069 New York District 19 -0.207 
Nevada District 2 0.276 New York District 20 -0.034 
Nevada District 3 0.105 New York District 21 -0.207 
New Hampshire District 1 0.382 New York District 22 0.069 
New Hampshire District 2 0.324 New York District 23 -0.138 
New Jersey District 1 -0.345 New York District 24 0.207 
New Jersey District 2 0.000 New York District 25 0.069 
New Jersey District 3 0.138 New York District 26 -0.034 
New Jersey District 4 0.345 New York District 27 0.000 
New Jersey District 5 0.379 New York District 28 -0.379 
New Jersey District 6 -0.241 New York District 29 -0.034 
New Jersey District 7 0.172 North Carolina District 1 -0.357 
New Jersey District 8 -0.276 North Carolina District 2 -0.179 
New Jersey District 9 -0.276 North Carolina District 3 0.036 
New Jersey District 10 -0.379 North Carolina District 4 -0.071 
New Jersey District 11 0.276 North Carolina District 5 0.143 
New Jersey District 12 0.207 North Carolina District 6 0.321 
New Jersey District 13 -0.069 North Carolina District 7 -0.214 
New Mexico District 1 0.300 North Carolina District 8 0.000 
New Mexico District 2 0.267 North Carolina District 9 0.321 
New Mexico District 3 -0.233 North Carolina District 10 0.393 
New York District 1 -0.138 North Carolina District 11 0.071 
New York District 2 -0.207 North Carolina District 12 -0.174 
New York District 3 -0.103 North Carolina District 13 0.056 
New York District 4 -0.034 North Dakota District 1 -0.250 
New York District 5 -0.172 Ohio District 1 -0.069 
New York District 6 -0.552 Ohio District 2 0.379 
New York District 7 -0.517 Ohio District 3 -0.276 
New York District 8 -0.552 Ohio District 4 0.379 
New York District 9 -0.517 Ohio District 5 0.345 
New York District 10 -0.552 Ohio District 6 0.138 
New York District 11 -0.552 Ohio District 7 0.345 
New York District 12 -0.552 Ohio District 8 0.379 
New York District 13 -0.172 Ohio District 9 -0.310 
New York District 14 -0.207 Ohio District 10 0.069 
New York District 15 -0.310 Ohio District 11 -0.379 
New York District 16 -0.552 Ohio District 12 0.310 
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NAES District Big Loser % NAES District Big Loser % 
Ohio District 13 -0.345 South Carolina District 3 0.172 
Ohio District 14 -0.172 South Carolina District 4 0.276 
Ohio District 15 0.310 South Carolina District 5 -0.138 
Ohio District 16 0.345 South Carolina District 6 -0.241 
Ohio District 17 -0.310 South Dakota District 1 0.069 
Ohio District 18 -0.103 Tennessee District 1 0.300 
Oklahoma District 1 0.207 Tennessee District 2 0.267 
Oklahoma District 2 -0.138 Tennessee District 3 0.000 
Oklahoma District 3 -0.069 Tennessee District 4 -0.233 
Oklahoma District 4 -0.069 Tennessee District 5 -0.400 
Oklahoma District 5 0.414 Tennessee District 6 -0.333 
Oregon District 1 -0.138 Tennessee District 7 0.267 
Oregon District 2 0.310 Tennessee District 8 -0.433 
Oregon District 3 -0.345 Tennessee District 9 -0.400 
Oregon District 4 -0.241 Texas District 1 0.000 
Oregon District 5 0.034 Texas District 2 0.067 
Pennsylvania District 1 -0.276 Texas District 3 0.567 
Pennsylvania District 2 -0.276 Texas District 4 -0.033 
Pennsylvania District 3 -0.138 Texas District 5 0.067 
Pennsylvania District 4 -0.103 Texas District 6 0.433 
Pennsylvania District 5 0.448 Texas District 7 0.567 
Pennsylvania District 6 -0.103 Texas District 8 0.533 
Pennsylvania District 7 0.414 Texas District 9 0.067 
Pennsylvania District 8 0.276 Texas District 10 -0.100 
Pennsylvania District 9 0.483 Texas District 11 0.000 
Pennsylvania District 10 0.414 Texas District 12 0.067 
Pennsylvania District 11 -0.172 Texas District 13 0.300 
Pennsylvania District 12 -0.276 Texas District 14 0.167 
Pennsylvania District 13 0.207 Texas District 15 -0.100 
Pennsylvania District 14 -0.276 Texas District 16 -0.033 
Pennsylvania District 15 0.138 Texas District 17 -0.033 
Pennsylvania District 16 0.483 Texas District 18 -0.167 
Pennsylvania District 17 0.414 Texas District 19 0.500 
Pennsylvania District 18 0.000 Texas District 20 -0.167 
Pennsylvania District 19 0.448 Texas District 21 0.567 
Rhode Island District 1 -0.364 Texas District 22 0.567 
Rhode Island District 2 -0.303 Texas District 23 0.267 
South Carolina District 1 0.414 Texas District 24 -0.033 
South Carolina District 2 0.310 Texas District 25 0.000 
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NAES District Big Loser % NAES District Big Loser % 
Texas District 26 0.500 Wisconsin District 7 -0.310 
Texas District 27 -0.100 Wisconsin District 8 0.241 
Texas District 28 0.000 Wyoming District 1 0.367 
Texas District 29 0.000 
  Texas District 30 0.000 
  Texas District 31 0.350 
  Texas District 32 0.350 
  Utah District 1 0.714 
  Utah District 2 0.429 
  Utah District 3 0.607 
  Vermont District 1 0.176 
  Virginia District 1 0.345 
  Virginia District 2 0.103 
  Virginia District 3 0.069 
  Virginia District 4 -0.138 
  Virginia District 5 -0.103 
  Virginia District 6 0.241 
  Virginia District 7 0.448 
  Virginia District 8 0.034 
  Virginia District 9 -0.138 
  Virginia District 10 0.483 
  Virginia District 11 0.333 
  Washington District 1 -0.036 
  Washington District 2 -0.179 
  Washington District 3 -0.214 
  Washington District 4 0.214 
  Washington District 5 -0.214 
  Washington District 6 -0.429 
  Washington District 7 -0.464 
  Washington District 8 0.214 
  Washington District 9 -0.217 
  West Virginia District 1 -0.586 
  West Virginia District 2 -0.483 
  West Virginia District 3 -0.621 
  Wisconsin District 1 -0.069 
  Wisconsin District 2 -0.034 
  Wisconsin District 3 0.034 
  Wisconsin District 4 -0.276 
  Wisconsin District 5 -0.310 
  Wisconsin District 6 0.345 
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NAES District Simple Loser % NAES District Simple Loser % 
Alabama District 1 0.586 California District 21 0.310 
Alabama District 2 0.586 California District 22 0.103 
Alabama District 3 0.103 California District 23 -0.103 
Alabama District 4 0.103 California District 24 -0.379 
Alabama District 5 -0.172 California District 25 -0.034 
Alabama District 6 0.241 California District 26 -0.379 
Alabama District 7 -0.172 California District 27 -0.172 
Arizona District 1 0.600 California District 28 -0.103 
Arizona District 2 0.000 California District 29 -0.448 
Arizona District 3 0.667 California District 30 -0.448 
Arizona District 4 0.600 California District 31 -0.448 
Arizona District 5 0.600 California District 32 -0.448 
Arizona District 6 0.520 California District 33 -0.103 
Arizona District 7 0.400 California District 34 -0.448 
Arizona District 8 0.500 California District 35 -0.103 
Arkansas District 1 -0.600 California District 36 -0.379 
Arkansas District 2 -0.533 California District 37 -0.103 
Arkansas District 3 0.133 California District 38 0.172 
Arkansas District 4 -0.333 California District 39 0.241 
California District 1 -0.241 California District 40 0.310 
California District 2 0.310 California District 41 0.310 
California District 3 -0.241 California District 42 -0.034 
California District 4 -0.034 California District 43 0.172 
California District 5 -0.448 California District 44 0.034 
California District 6 -0.448 California District 45 0.310 
California District 7 -0.448 California District 46 -0.083 
California District 8 -0.448 California District 47 0.083 
California District 9 -0.448 California District 48 0.167 
California District 10 -0.310 California District 49 0.000 
California District 11 -0.034 California District 50 -0.250 
California District 12 -0.103 California District 51 0.083 
California District 13 -0.448 California District 52 0.167 
California District 14 -0.103 California District 53 -0.158 
California District 15 -0.310 Colorado District 1 -0.241 
California District 16 -0.448 Colorado District 2 -0.241 
California District 17 -0.172 Colorado District 3 0.241 
California District 18 -0.448 Colorado District 4 0.517 
California District 19 0.241 Colorado District 5 0.517 
California District 20 -0.103 Colorado District 6 0.517 
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NAES District Simple Loser % NAES District Simple Loser % 
Colorado District 7 0.263 Georgia District 8 -0.133 
Connecticut District 1 -0.517 Georgia District 9 -0.200 
Connecticut District 2 -0.379 Georgia District 10 -0.133 
Connecticut District 3 -0.517 Georgia District 11 -0.040 
Connecticut District 4 0.241 Georgia District 12 -0.100 
Connecticut District 5 -0.034 Georgia District 13 -0.200 
Deleware District 1 -0.133 Idaho District 1 0.655 
Florida District 1 -0.036 Idaho District 2 0.517 
Florida District 2 -0.393 Illinois District 1 -0.448 
Florida District 3 -0.370 Illinois District 2 -0.448 
Florida District 4 0.179 Illinois District 3 -0.448 
Florida District 5 0.036 Illinois District 4 -0.241 
Florida District 6 0.179 Illinois District 5 -0.379 
Florida District 7 0.036 Illinois District 6 0.310 
Florida District 8 0.393 Illinois District 7 -0.448 
Florida District 9 0.393 Illinois District 8 -0.034 
Florida District 10 0.321 Illinois District 9 -0.448 
Florida District 11 -0.393 Illinois District 10 0.310 
Florida District 12 0.370 Illinois District 11 -0.103 
Florida District 13 0.393 Illinois District 12 -0.103 
Florida District 14 0.036 Illinois District 13 0.310 
Florida District 15 0.321 Illinois District 14 0.310 
Florida District 16 0.074 Illinois District 15 0.310 
Florida District 17 -0.393 Illinois District 16 0.241 
Florida District 18 0.107 Illinois District 17 -0.448 
Florida District 19 -0.393 Illinois District 18 0.310 
Florida District 20 -0.261 Illinois District 19 -0.310 
Florida District 21 0.261 Indiana District 1 -0.143 
Florida District 22 0.261 Indiana District 2 0.214 
Florida District 23 -0.261 Indiana District 3 0.214 
Florida District 24 0.056 Indiana District 4 0.500 
Florida District 25 0.056 Indiana District 5 0.429 
Georgia District 1 -0.067 Indiana District 6 0.643 
Georgia District 2 -0.467 Indiana District 7 0.571 
Georgia District 3 -0.133 Indiana District 8 0.259 
Georgia District 4 -0.200 Indiana District 9 -0.143 
Georgia District 5 -0.467 Iowa District 1 0.310 
Georgia District 6 0.267 Iowa District 2 0.310 
Georgia District 7 -0.133 Iowa District 3 -0.172 
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NAES District Simple Loser % NAES District Simple Loser % 
Iowa District 4 -0.103 Michigan District 1 -0.600 
Iowa District 5 0.241 Michigan District 2 0.133 
Kansas District 1 0.793 Michigan District 3 -0.200 
Kansas District 2 0.379 Michigan District 4 0.133 
Kansas District 3 0.586 Michigan District 5 -0.267 
Kansas District 4 0.379 Michigan District 6 -0.200 
Kentucky District 1 -0.034 Michigan District 7 -0.200 
Kentucky District 2 -0.034 Michigan District 8 -0.400 
Kentucky District 3 -0.103 Michigan District 9 -0.200 
Kentucky District 4 0.172 Michigan District 10 -0.267 
Kentucky District 5 0.379 Michigan District 11 0.133 
Kentucky District 6 0.172 Michigan District 12 -0.600 
Louisiana District 1 0.071 Michigan District 13 -0.600 
Louisiana District 2 -0.643 Michigan District 14 -0.600 
Louisiana District 3 -0.429 Michigan District 15 -0.600 
Louisiana District 4 -0.286 Minnesota District 1 -0.143 
Louisiana District 5 -0.286 Minnesota District 2 0.000 
Louisiana District 6 0.071 Minnesota District 3 0.286 
Louisiana District 7 -0.586 Minnesota District 4 -0.500 
Maine District 1 -0.067 Minnesota District 5 -0.500 
Maine District 2 0.133 Minnesota District 6 -0.357 
Maryland District 1 -0.310 Minnesota District 7 -0.214 
Maryland District 2 -0.172 Minnesota District 8 -0.500 
Maryland District 3 -0.793 Mississippi District 1 0.333 
Maryland District 4 -0.655 Mississippi District 2 0.133 
Maryland District 5 -0.793 Mississippi District 3 0.267 
Maryland District 6 -0.379 Mississippi District 4 0.067 
Maryland District 7 -0.793 Mississippi District 5 0.310 
Maryland District 8 -0.241 Missouri District 1 -0.214 
Massachusetts District 1 -0.333 Missouri District 2 0.357 
Massachusetts District 2 -0.667 Missouri District 3 -0.214 
Massachusetts District 3 -0.533 Missouri District 4 -0.214 
Massachusetts District 4 -0.667 Missouri District 5 -0.214 
Massachusetts District 5 -0.667 Missouri District 6 0.286 
Massachusetts District 6 -0.533 Missouri District 7 0.571 
Massachusetts District 7 -0.667 Missouri District 8 0.500 
Massachusetts District 8 -0.667 Missouri District 9 0.071 
Massachusetts District 9 -0.667 Montana District 1 0.000 
Massachusetts District 10 -0.667 Nebraska District 1 0.400 
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NAES District Simple Loser % NAES District Simple Loser % 
Nebraska District 2 0.200 New York District 17 -0.586 
Nebraska District 3 0.400 New York District 18 -0.586 
Nevada District 1 -0.379 New York District 19 -0.172 
Nevada District 2 0.241 New York District 20 -0.034 
Nevada District 3 -0.158 New York District 21 -0.241 
New Hampshire District 1 0.647 New York District 22 0.103 
New Hampshire District 2 0.588 New York District 23 -0.172 
New Jersey District 1 -0.655 New York District 24 0.172 
New Jersey District 2 -0.310 New York District 25 0.172 
New Jersey District 3 -0.241 New York District 26 -0.172 
New Jersey District 4 0.103 New York District 27 0.172 
New Jersey District 5 0.103 New York District 28 -0.586 
New Jersey District 6 -0.655 New York District 29 -0.172 
New Jersey District 7 0.103 North Carolina District 1 -0.143 
New Jersey District 8 -0.586 North Carolina District 2 -0.071 
New Jersey District 9 -0.655 North Carolina District 3 0.214 
New Jersey District 10 -0.655 North Carolina District 4 0.000 
New Jersey District 11 0.034 North Carolina District 5 0.214 
New Jersey District 12 -0.103 North Carolina District 6 0.571 
New Jersey District 13 -0.310 North Carolina District 7 -0.143 
New Mexico District 1 0.333 North Carolina District 8 0.071 
New Mexico District 2 0.333 North Carolina District 9 0.643 
New Mexico District 3 -0.400 North Carolina District 10 0.643 
New York District 1 -0.172 North Carolina District 11 0.429 
New York District 2 -0.310 North Carolina District 12 0.043 
New York District 3 -0.172 North Carolina District 13 0.333 
New York District 4 -0.103 North Dakota District 1 -0.429 
New York District 5 -0.241 Ohio District 1 0.034 
New York District 6 -0.586 Ohio District 2 0.448 
New York District 7 -0.586 Ohio District 3 -0.241 
New York District 8 -0.586 Ohio District 4 0.448 
New York District 9 -0.586 Ohio District 5 0.448 
New York District 10 -0.586 Ohio District 6 0.103 
New York District 11 -0.586 Ohio District 7 0.448 
New York District 12 -0.586 Ohio District 8 0.448 
New York District 13 -0.172 Ohio District 9 -0.310 
New York District 14 -0.241 Ohio District 10 0.172 
New York District 15 -0.241 Ohio District 11 -0.310 
New York District 16 -0.586 Ohio District 12 0.448 
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NAES District Simple Loser % NAES District Simple Loser % 
Ohio District 13 -0.310 South Carolina District 3 0.241 
Ohio District 14 -0.241 South Carolina District 4 0.448 
Ohio District 15 0.448 South Carolina District 5 -0.103 
Ohio District 16 0.448 South Carolina District 6 -0.103 
Ohio District 17 -0.241 South Dakota District 1 0.172 
Ohio District 18 0.034 Tennessee District 1 0.400 
Oklahoma District 1 0.517 Tennessee District 2 0.400 
Oklahoma District 2 0.103 Tennessee District 3 0.000 
Oklahoma District 3 0.172 Tennessee District 4 -0.067 
Oklahoma District 4 0.241 Tennessee District 5 -0.333 
Oklahoma District 5 0.655 Tennessee District 6 -0.333 
Oregon District 1 -0.448 Tennessee District 7 0.400 
Oregon District 2 0.310 Tennessee District 8 -0.333 
Oregon District 3 -0.448 Tennessee District 9 -0.333 
Oregon District 4 -0.448 Texas District 1 0.000 
Oregon District 5 -0.103 Texas District 2 0.000 
Pennsylvania District 1 -0.172 Texas District 3 0.733 
Pennsylvania District 2 -0.172 Texas District 4 0.000 
Pennsylvania District 3 -0.103 Texas District 5 0.267 
Pennsylvania District 4 -0.034 Texas District 6 0.667 
Pennsylvania District 5 0.586 Texas District 7 0.733 
Pennsylvania District 6 -0.103 Texas District 8 0.733 
Pennsylvania District 7 0.448 Texas District 9 0.067 
Pennsylvania District 8 0.241 Texas District 10 0.000 
Pennsylvania District 9 0.586 Texas District 11 0.000 
Pennsylvania District 10 0.586 Texas District 12 0.267 
Pennsylvania District 11 -0.172 Texas District 13 0.467 
Pennsylvania District 12 -0.172 Texas District 14 0.400 
Pennsylvania District 13 0.310 Texas District 15 0.000 
Pennsylvania District 14 -0.172 Texas District 16 0.000 
Pennsylvania District 15 0.379 Texas District 17 0.000 
Pennsylvania District 16 0.586 Texas District 18 0.000 
Pennsylvania District 17 0.517 Texas District 19 0.667 
Pennsylvania District 18 0.034 Texas District 20 0.000 
Pennsylvania District 19 0.586 Texas District 21 0.733 
Rhode Island District 1 -0.152 Texas District 22 0.733 
Rhode Island District 2 -0.091 Texas District 23 0.400 
South Carolina District 1 0.655 Texas District 24 0.000 
South Carolina District 2 0.655 Texas District 25 0.000 
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NAES District Simple Loser % NAES District Simple Loser % 
Texas District 26 0.667 Wisconsin District 7 -0.586 
Texas District 27 0.000 Wisconsin District 8 0.103 
Texas District 28 0.200 Wyoming District 1 0.733 
Texas District 29 0.200 
  Texas District 30 0.200 
  Texas District 31 0.600 
  Texas District 32 0.600 
  Utah District 1 1.000 
  Utah District 2 0.571 
  Utah District 3 0.786 
  Vermont District 1 0.176 
  Virginia District 1 0.655 
  Virginia District 2 0.172 
  Virginia District 3 0.241 
  Virginia District 4 -0.034 
  Virginia District 5 -0.034 
  Virginia District 6 0.310 
  Virginia District 7 0.655 
  Virginia District 8 0.172 
  Virginia District 9 -0.103 
  Virginia District 10 0.655 
  Virginia District 11 0.500 
  Washington District 1 -0.214 
  Washington District 2 -0.500 
  Washington District 3 -0.571 
  Washington District 4 0.000 
  Washington District 5 -0.357 
  Washington District 6 -0.714 
  Washington District 7 -0.714 
  Washington District 8 0.071 
  Washington District 9 -0.565 
  West Virginia District 1 -0.724 
  West Virginia District 2 -0.586 
  West Virginia District 3 -0.724 
  Wisconsin District 1 -0.241 
  Wisconsin District 2 -0.310 
  Wisconsin District 3 -0.103 
  Wisconsin District 4 -0.586 
  Wisconsin District 5 -0.517 
  Wisconsin District 6 0.172 
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MTurk District Big Loser % MTurk District Big Loser % 
Alabama District 1 0.405 California District 20 -0.108 
Alabama District 2 0.351 California District 21 0.270 
Alabama District 3 -0.027 California District 22 0.162 
Alabama District 4 0.027 California District 23 -0.243 
Alabama District 5 -0.216 California District 24 -0.189 
Alabama District 6 0.216 California District 25 -0.027 
Alabama District 7 -0.270 California District 26 -0.297 
Alaska District 1 0.486 California District 27 -0.324 
Arizona District 1 0.368 California District 28 -0.270 
Arizona District 2 0.000 California District 29 -0.486 
Arizona District 3 0.474 California District 30 -0.432 
Arizona District 4 0.316 California District 31 -0.459 
Arizona District 5 0.395 California District 32 -0.459 
Arizona District 6 0.333 California District 33 -0.162 
Arizona District 7 0.071 California District 34 -0.432 
Arizona District 8 0.286 California District 35 -0.216 
Arkansas District 1 -0.395 California District 36 -0.216 
Arkansas District 2 -0.263 California District 37 -0.243 
Arkansas District 3 0.237 California District 38 -0.162 
Arkansas District 4 -0.263 California District 39 0.054 
California District 1 -0.351 California District 40 0.270 
California District 2 0.189 California District 41 0.216 
California District 3 -0.162 California District 42 0.108 
California District 4 -0.054 California District 43 -0.081 
California District 5 -0.459 California District 44 -0.081 
California District 6 -0.459 California District 45 0.216 
California District 7 -0.486 California District 46 -0.031 
California District 8 -0.459 California District 47 -0.094 
California District 9 -0.459 California District 48 0.125 
California District 10 -0.324 California District 49 0.000 
California District 11 -0.054 California District 50 -0.219 
California District 12 -0.243 California District 51 -0.063 
California District 13 -0.486 California District 52 0.094 
California District 14 -0.216 California District 53 -0.296 
California District 15 -0.324 Colorado District 1 -0.306 
California District 16 -0.486 Colorado District 2 -0.167 
California District 17 -0.243 Colorado District 3 0.083 
California District 18 -0.459 Colorado District 4 0.222 
California District 19 0.162 Colorado District 5 0.389 
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MTurk District Big Loser % MTurk District Big Loser % 
Colorado District 6 0.361 Georgia District 6 0.179 
Colorado District 7 0.038 Georgia District 7 -0.026 
Connecticut District 1 -0.486 Georgia District 8 -0.154 
Connecticut District 2 -0.243 Georgia District 9 0.051 
Connecticut District 3 -0.432 Georgia District 10 0.026 
Connecticut District 4 0.081 Georgia District 11 0.059 
Connecticut District 5 -0.081 Georgia District 12 -0.069 
Connecticut District 6 0.061 Georgia District 13 -0.138 
Deleware District 1 -0.103 Hawaii District 1 -0.568 
Florida District 1 0.083 Hawaii District 2 -0.676 
Florida District 2 -0.361 Idaho District 1 0.459 
Florida District 3 -0.257 Idaho District 2 0.486 
Florida District 4 0.111 Illinois District 1 -0.486 
Florida District 5 0.028 Illinois District 2 -0.486 
Florida District 6 0.111 Illinois District 3 -0.459 
Florida District 7 0.028 Illinois District 4 -0.324 
Florida District 8 0.278 Illinois District 5 -0.432 
Florida District 9 0.250 Illinois District 6 0.162 
Florida District 10 0.278 Illinois District 7 -0.486 
Florida District 11 -0.306 Illinois District 8 -0.162 
Florida District 12 0.229 Illinois District 9 -0.486 
Florida District 13 0.222 Illinois District 10 0.162 
Florida District 14 0.139 Illinois District 11 -0.189 
Florida District 15 0.167 Illinois District 12 -0.216 
Florida District 16 0.086 Illinois District 13 0.189 
Florida District 17 -0.417 Illinois District 14 0.189 
Florida District 18 0.111 Illinois District 15 0.162 
Florida District 19 -0.361 Illinois District 16 0.162 
Florida District 20 -0.290 Illinois District 17 -0.270 
Florida District 21 0.194 Illinois District 18 0.162 
Florida District 22 0.129 Illinois District 19 -0.189 
Florida District 23 -0.290 Illinois District 20 -0.182 
Florida District 24 0.000 Indiana District 1 -0.162 
Florida District 25 0.000 Indiana District 2 0.135 
Georgia District 1 0.051 Indiana District 3 0.216 
Georgia District 2 -0.308 Indiana District 4 0.351 
Georgia District 3 -0.026 Indiana District 5 0.432 
Georgia District 4 -0.231 Indiana District 6 0.541 
Georgia District 5 -0.385 Indiana District 7 0.351 
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MTurk District Big Loser % MTurk District Big Loser % 
Indiana District 8 0.083 Massachusetts District 5 -0.632 
Indiana District 9 -0.027 Massachusetts District 6 -0.579 
Indiana District 10 0.061 Massachusetts District 7 -0.711 
Iowa District 1 0.270 Massachusetts District 8 -0.711 
Iowa District 2 0.189 Massachusetts District 9 -0.711 
Iowa District 3 0.054 Massachusetts District 10 -0.632 
Iowa District 4 0.054 Michigan District 1 -0.316 
Iowa District 5 0.405 Michigan District 2 0.263 
Kansas District 1 0.784 Michigan District 3 0.158 
Kansas District 2 0.405 Michigan District 4 0.289 
Kansas District 3 0.514 Michigan District 5 -0.184 
Kansas District 4 0.405 Michigan District 6 0.158 
Kentucky District 1 -0.162 Michigan District 7 -0.053 
Kentucky District 2 -0.135 Michigan District 8 -0.132 
Kentucky District 3 -0.189 Michigan District 9 0.000 
Kentucky District 4 0.081 Michigan District 10 0.026 
Kentucky District 5 0.270 Michigan District 11 0.105 
Kentucky District 6 0.000 Michigan District 12 -0.263 
Louisiana District 1 0.243 Michigan District 13 -0.316 
Louisiana District 2 -0.421 Michigan District 14 -0.395 
Louisiana District 3 -0.243 Michigan District 15 -0.395 
Louisiana District 4 -0.081 Michigan District 16 -0.324 
Louisiana District 5 -0.053 Minnesota District 1 -0.056 
Louisiana District 6 0.162 Minnesota District 2 0.083 
Louisiana District 7 -0.263 Minnesota District 3 0.389 
Maine District 1 -0.053 Minnesota District 4 -0.306 
Maine District 2 0.079 Minnesota District 5 -0.361 
Maryland District 1 -0.135 Minnesota District 6 -0.056 
Maryland District 2 -0.162 Minnesota District 7 -0.167 
Maryland District 3 -0.594 Minnesota District 8 -0.361 
Maryland District 4 -0.486 Mississippi District 1 0.256 
Maryland District 5 -0.595 Mississippi District 2 0.000 
Maryland District 6 -0.243 Mississippi District 3 0.205 
Maryland District 7 -0.649 Mississippi District 4 0.026 
Maryland District 8 -0.243 Mississippi District 5 0.171 
Massachusetts District 1 -0.395 Missouri District 1 -0.270 
Massachusetts District 2 -0.711 Missouri District 2 0.324 
Massachusetts District 3 -0.605 Missouri District 3 -0.135 
Massachusetts District 4 -0.684 Missouri District 4 -0.243 
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MTurk District Big Loser % MTurk District Big Loser % 
Missouri District 5 -0.189 New York District 10 -0.622 
Missouri District 6 0.162 New York District 11 -0.622 
Missouri District 7 0.378 New York District 12 -0.622 
Missouri District 8 0.324 New York District 13 -0.270 
Missouri District 9 0.189 New York District 14 -0.351 
Montana District 1 -0.054 New York District 15 -0.432 
Nebraska District 1 0.462 New York District 16 -0.622 
Nebraska District 2 0.308 New York District 17 -0.622 
Nebraska District 3 0.487 New York District 18 -0.568 
Nevada District 1 -0.162 New York District 19 -0.243 
Nevada District 2 0.216 New York District 20 -0.135 
Nevada District 3 0.037 New York District 21 -0.351 
New Hampshire District 1 0.295 New York District 22 -0.135 
New Hampshire District 2 0.250 New York District 23 -0.135 
New Jersey District 1 -0.351 New York District 24 0.081 
New Jersey District 2 0.081 New York District 25 -0.027 
New Jersey District 3 0.135 New York District 26 -0.135 
New Jersey District 4 0.351 New York District 27 -0.162 
New Jersey District 5 0.297 New York District 28 -0.486 
New Jersey District 6 -0.270 New York District 29 -0.135 
New Jersey District 7 0.135 New York District 30 -0.152 
New Jersey District 8 -0.297 New York District 31 -0.061 
New Jersey District 9 -0.297 North Carolina District 1 -0.351 
New Jersey District 10 -0.378 North Carolina District 2 -0.216 
New Jersey District 11 0.297 North Carolina District 3 0.108 
New Jersey District 12 0.108 North Carolina District 4 -0.135 
New Jersey District 13 -0.135 North Carolina District 5 0.108 
New Mexico District 1 0.158 North Carolina District 6 0.324 
New Mexico District 2 0.158 North Carolina District 7 -0.243 
New Mexico District 3 -0.342 North Carolina District 8 0.000 
New York District 1 -0.243 North Carolina District 9 0.324 
New York District 2 -0.351 North Carolina District 10 0.351 
New York District 3 -0.135 North Carolina District 11 0.027 
New York District 4 -0.216 North Carolina District 12 -0.219 
New York District 5 -0.324 North Carolina District 13 -0.037 
New York District 6 -0.622 North Dakota District 1 -0.216 
New York District 7 -0.595 Ohio District 1 -0.054 
New York District 8 -0.622 Ohio District 2 0.324 
New York District 9 -0.595 Ohio District 3 -0.162 
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MTurk District Big Loser % MTurk District Big Loser % 
Ohio District 4 0.324 Pennsylvania District 13 0.081 
Ohio District 5 0.324 Pennsylvania District 14 -0.324 
Ohio District 6 0.027 Pennsylvania District 15 0.081 
Ohio District 7 0.324 Pennsylvania District 16 0.378 
Ohio District 8 0.378 Pennsylvania District 17 0.216 
Ohio District 9 -0.324 Pennsylvania District 18 0.027 
Ohio District 10 0.000 Pennsylvania District 19 0.405 
Ohio District 11 -0.378 Pennsylvania District 20 -0.152 
Ohio District 12 0.270 Pennsylvania District 21 0.273 
Ohio District 13 -0.351 Rhode Island District 1 -0.439 
Ohio District 14 -0.081 Rhode Island District 2 -0.390 
Ohio District 15 0.270 South Carolina District 1 0.378 
Ohio District 16 0.297 South Carolina District 2 0.297 
Ohio District 17 -0.324 South Carolina District 3 0.216 
Ohio District 18 -0.081 South Carolina District 4 0.297 
Ohio District 19 -0.030 South Carolina District 5 -0.162 
Oklahoma District 1 0.270 South Carolina District 6 -0.270 
Oklahoma District 2 -0.162 South Dakota District 1 0.027 
Oklahoma District 3 0.054 Tennessee District 1 0.316 
Oklahoma District 4 0.054 Tennessee District 2 0.289 
Oklahoma District 5 0.432 Tennessee District 3 0.079 
Oklahoma District 6 0.061 Tennessee District 4 -0.237 
Oregon District 1 -0.216 Tennessee District 5 -0.395 
Oregon District 2 0.297 Tennessee District 6 -0.342 
Oregon District 3 -0.378 Tennessee District 7 0.289 
Oregon District 4 -0.297 Tennessee District 8 -0.421 
Oregon District 5 0.000 Tennessee District 9 -0.395 
Pennsylvania District 1 -0.324 Texas District 1 0.132 
Pennsylvania District 2 -0.324 Texas District 2 0.158 
Pennsylvania District 3 -0.108 Texas District 3 0.579 
Pennsylvania District 4 -0.081 Texas District 4 0.105 
Pennsylvania District 5 0.378 Texas District 5 0.184 
Pennsylvania District 6 -0.108 Texas District 6 0.474 
Pennsylvania District 7 0.297 Texas District 7 0.553 
Pennsylvania District 8 0.189 Texas District 8 0.553 
Pennsylvania District 9 0.432 Texas District 9 0.026 
Pennsylvania District 10 0.324 Texas District 10 0.000 
Pennsylvania District 11 -0.216 Texas District 11 0.132 
Pennsylvania District 12 -0.297 Texas District 12 0.184 
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MTurk District Big Loser % MTurk District Big Loser % 
Texas District 13 0.368 Washington District 6 -0.405 
Texas District 14 0.263 Washington District 7 -0.432 
Texas District 15 -0.079 Washington District 8 0.162 
Texas District 16 -0.053 Washington District 9 -0.250 
Texas District 17 0.026 West Virginia District 1 -0.632 
Texas District 18 -0.158 West Virginia District 2 -0.474 
Texas District 19 0.500 West Virginia District 3 -0.658 
Texas District 20 -0.158 Wisconsin District 1 0.000 
Texas District 21 0.579 Wisconsin District 2 -0.135 
Texas District 22 0.500 Wisconsin District 3 -0.054 
Texas District 23 0.289 Wisconsin District 4 -0.324 
Texas District 24 0.079 Wisconsin District 5 -0.189 
Texas District 25 -0.026 Wisconsin District 6 0.324 
Texas District 26 0.526 Wisconsin District 7 -0.351 
Texas District 27 -0.079 Wisconsin District 8 0.189 
Texas District 28 -0.030 Wisconsin District 9 0.273 
Texas District 29 -0.030 Wyoming District 1 0.395 
Texas District 30 -0.030 
  Texas District 31 0.429 
  Texas District 32 0.321 
  Utah District 1 0.757 
  Utah District 2 0.405 
  Utah District 3 0.676 
  Vermont District 1 0.136 
  Virginia District 1 0.297 
  Virginia District 2 0.054 
  Virginia District 3 -0.054 
  Virginia District 4 -0.081 
  Virginia District 5 -0.081 
  Virginia District 6 0.243 
  Virginia District 7 0.405 
  Virginia District 8 -0.081 
  Virginia District 9 -0.216 
  Virginia District 10 0.405 
  Virginia District 11 0.250 
  Washington District 1 -0.108 
  Washington District 2 -0.216 
  Washington District 3 -0.243 
  Washington District 4 0.216 
  Washington District 5 -0.135 
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MTurk District Simple Loser % MTurk District Simple Loser % 
Alabama District 1 0.676 California District 20 -0.243 
Alabama District 2 0.676 California District 21 0.243 
Alabama District 3 0.297 California District 22 0.081 
Alabama District 4 0.297 California District 23 -0.243 
Alabama District 5 -0.081 California District 24 -0.297 
Alabama District 6 0.405 California District 25 -0.027 
Alabama District 7 -0.081 California District 26 -0.297 
Alaska District 1 0.676 California District 27 -0.297 
Arizona District 1 0.579 California District 28 -0.243 
Arizona District 2 0.158 California District 29 -0.514 
Arizona District 3 0.684 California District 30 -0.514 
Arizona District 4 0.474 California District 31 -0.514 
Arizona District 5 0.526 California District 32 -0.514 
Arizona District 6 0.576 California District 33 -0.189 
Arizona District 7 0.286 California District 34 -0.514 
Arizona District 8 0.429 California District 35 -0.243 
Arkansas District 1 -0.579 California District 36 -0.459 
Arkansas District 2 -0.526 California District 37 -0.243 
Arkansas District 3 0.158 California District 38 -0.027 
Arkansas District 4 -0.351 California District 39 0.027 
California District 1 -0.351 California District 40 0.243 
California District 2 0.243 California District 41 0.243 
California District 3 -0.189 California District 42 -0.027 
California District 4 -0.027 California District 43 -0.027 
California District 5 -0.514 California District 44 0.027 
California District 6 -0.514 California District 45 0.243 
California District 7 -0.514 California District 46 -0.063 
California District 8 -0.514 California District 47 -0.125 
California District 9 -0.514 California District 48 0.125 
California District 10 -0.405 California District 49 0.000 
California District 11 -0.135 California District 50 -0.188 
California District 12 -0.243 California District 51 -0.125 
California District 13 -0.514 California District 52 0.125 
California District 14 -0.243 California District 53 -0.333 
California District 15 -0.405 Colorado District 1 -0.333 
California District 16 -0.514 Colorado District 2 -0.333 
California District 17 -0.297 Colorado District 3 0.056 
California District 18 -0.514 Colorado District 4 0.389 
California District 19 0.189 Colorado District 5 0.444 
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MTurk District Simple Loser % MTurk District Simple Loser % 
Colorado District 6 0.444 Georgia District 6 0.447 
Colorado District 7 0.077 Georgia District 7 0.132 
Connecticut District 1 -0.568 Georgia District 8 0.026 
Connecticut District 2 -0.405 Georgia District 9 0.079 
Connecticut District 3 -0.568 Georgia District 10 0.132 
Connecticut District 4 0.135 Georgia District 11 0.242 
Connecticut District 5 -0.135 Georgia District 12 0.036 
Connecticut District 6 0.091 Georgia District 13 -0.036 
Deleware District 1 -0.179 Hawaii District 1 -0.730 
Florida District 1 0.083 Hawaii District 2 -0.838 
Florida District 2 -0.361 Idaho District 1 0.676 
Florida District 3 -0.343 Idaho District 2 0.622 
Florida District 4 0.250 Illinois District 1 -0.568 
Florida District 5 0.139 Illinois District 2 -0.568 
Florida District 6 0.250 Illinois District 3 -0.568 
Florida District 7 0.114 Illinois District 4 -0.405 
Florida District 8 0.361 Illinois District 5 -0.514 
Florida District 9 0.417 Illinois District 6 0.189 
Florida District 10 0.361 Illinois District 7 -0.568 
Florida District 11 -0.361 Illinois District 8 -0.243 
Florida District 12 0.400 Illinois District 9 -0.568 
Florida District 13 0.417 Illinois District 10 0.189 
Florida District 14 0.139 Illinois District 11 -0.189 
Florida District 15 0.361 Illinois District 12 -0.297 
Florida District 16 0.114 Illinois District 13 0.189 
Florida District 17 -0.361 Illinois District 14 0.135 
Florida District 18 0.194 Illinois District 15 0.189 
Florida District 19 -0.343 Illinois District 16 0.135 
Florida District 20 -0.258 Illinois District 17 -0.568 
Florida District 21 0.323 Illinois District 18 0.189 
Florida District 22 0.194 Illinois District 19 -0.297 
Florida District 23 -0.233 Illinois District 20 -0.294 
Florida District 24 0.080 Indiana District 1 -0.135 
Florida District 25 0.160 Indiana District 2 0.189 
Georgia District 1 0.184 Indiana District 3 0.297 
Georgia District 2 -0.289 Indiana District 4 0.514 
Georgia District 3 0.079 Indiana District 5 0.459 
Georgia District 4 -0.079 Indiana District 6 0.622 
Georgia District 5 -0.289 Indiana District 7 0.405 
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MTurk District Simple Loser % MTurk District Simple Loser % 
Indiana District 8 0.222 Massachusetts District 5 -0.737 
Indiana District 9 -0.081 Massachusetts District 6 -0.632 
Indiana District 10 -0.030 Massachusetts District 7 -0.737 
Iowa District 1 0.189 Massachusetts District 8 -0.737 
Iowa District 2 0.189 Massachusetts District 9 -0.737 
Iowa District 3 -0.243 Massachusetts District 10 -0.737 
Iowa District 4 -0.027 Michigan District 1 -0.684 
Iowa District 5 0.243 Michigan District 2 0.053 
Kansas District 1 0.784 Michigan District 3 -0.211 
Kansas District 2 0.405 Michigan District 4 0.053 
Kansas District 3 0.459 Michigan District 5 -0.421 
Kansas District 4 0.459 Michigan District 6 -0.211 
Kentucky District 1 0.135 Michigan District 7 -0.263 
Kentucky District 2 0.135 Michigan District 8 -0.368 
Kentucky District 3 -0.027 Michigan District 9 -0.263 
Kentucky District 4 0.297 Michigan District 10 -0.263 
Kentucky District 5 0.459 Michigan District 11 0.053 
Kentucky District 6 0.135 Michigan District 12 -0.684 
Louisiana District 1 0.222 Michigan District 13 -0.684 
Louisiana District 2 -0.432 Michigan District 14 -0.684 
Louisiana District 3 -0.333 Michigan District 15 -0.684 
Louisiana District 4 -0.056 Michigan District 16 -0.647 
Louisiana District 5 -0.056 Minnesota District 1 -0.222 
Louisiana District 6 0.222 Minnesota District 2 0.000 
Louisiana District 7 -0.297 Minnesota District 3 0.222 
Maine District 1 -0.158 Minnesota District 4 -0.556 
Maine District 2 0.000 Minnesota District 5 -0.556 
Maryland District 1 -0.351 Minnesota District 6 -0.278 
Maryland District 2 -0.351 Minnesota District 7 -0.333 
Maryland District 3 -0.838 Minnesota District 8 -0.556 
Maryland District 4 -0.730 Mississippi District 1 0.447 
Maryland District 5 -0.838 Mississippi District 2 0.184 
Maryland District 6 -0.351 Mississippi District 3 0.447 
Maryland District 7 -0.838 Mississippi District 4 0.132 
Maryland District 8 -0.405 Mississippi District 5 0.441 
Massachusetts District 1 -0.474 Missouri District 1 -0.189 
Massachusetts District 2 -0.737 Missouri District 2 0.405 
Massachusetts District 3 -0.632 Missouri District 3 -0.189 
Massachusetts District 4 -0.737 Missouri District 4 -0.189 
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MTurk District Simple Loser % MTurk District Simple Loser % 
Missouri District 5 -0.189 New York District 10 -0.676 
Missouri District 6 0.351 New York District 11 -0.676 
Missouri District 7 0.568 New York District 12 -0.676 
Missouri District 8 0.514 New York District 13 -0.243 
Missouri District 9 0.189 New York District 14 -0.405 
Montana District 1 0.027 New York District 15 -0.405 
Nebraska District 1 0.474 New York District 16 -0.676 
Nebraska District 2 0.316 New York District 17 -0.676 
Nebraska District 3 0.474 New York District 18 -0.676 
Nevada District 1 -0.351 New York District 19 -0.297 
Nevada District 2 0.297 New York District 20 -0.189 
Nevada District 3 -0.037 New York District 21 -0.405 
New Hampshire District 1 0.364 New York District 22 -0.135 
New Hampshire District 2 0.318 New York District 23 -0.189 
New Jersey District 1 -0.730 New York District 24 -0.027 
New Jersey District 2 -0.297 New York District 25 0.027 
New Jersey District 3 -0.297 New York District 26 -0.189 
New Jersey District 4 0.027 New York District 27 -0.081 
New Jersey District 5 0.027 New York District 28 -0.676 
New Jersey District 6 -0.730 New York District 29 -0.243 
New Jersey District 7 0.027 New York District 30 -0.212 
New Jersey District 8 -0.676 New York District 31 -0.030 
New Jersey District 9 -0.730 North Carolina District 1 -0.243 
New Jersey District 10 -0.730 North Carolina District 2 -0.189 
New Jersey District 11 -0.027 North Carolina District 3 0.189 
New Jersey District 12 -0.297 North Carolina District 4 -0.135 
New Jersey District 13 -0.459 North Carolina District 5 0.189 
New Mexico District 1 0.211 North Carolina District 6 0.459 
New Mexico District 2 0.211 North Carolina District 7 -0.243 
New Mexico District 3 -0.474 North Carolina District 8 0.027 
New York District 1 -0.351 North Carolina District 9 0.514 
New York District 2 -0.459 North Carolina District 10 0.514 
New York District 3 -0.189 North Carolina District 11 0.243 
New York District 4 -0.297 North Carolina District 12 -0.125 
New York District 5 -0.405 North Carolina District 13 0.037 
New York District 6 -0.676 North Dakota District 1 -0.351 
New York District 7 -0.676 Ohio District 1 0.027 
New York District 8 -0.676 Ohio District 2 0.405 
New York District 9 -0.676 Ohio District 3 -0.135 
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MTurk District Simple Loser % MTurk District Simple Loser % 
Ohio District 4 0.405 Pennsylvania District 13 0.081 
Ohio District 5 0.405 Pennsylvania District 14 -0.297 
Ohio District 6 -0.027 Pennsylvania District 15 0.297 
Ohio District 7 0.405 Pennsylvania District 16 0.459 
Ohio District 8 0.405 Pennsylvania District 17 0.243 
Ohio District 9 -0.351 Pennsylvania District 18 0.027 
Ohio District 10 0.027 Pennsylvania District 19 0.459 
Ohio District 11 -0.351 Pennsylvania District 20 -0.212 
Ohio District 12 0.405 Pennsylvania District 21 0.394 
Ohio District 13 -0.351 Rhode Island District 1 -0.268 
Ohio District 14 -0.135 Rhode Island District 2 -0.220 
Ohio District 15 0.351 South Carolina District 1 0.730 
Ohio District 16 0.351 South Carolina District 2 0.730 
Ohio District 17 -0.297 South Carolina District 3 0.405 
Ohio District 18 -0.027 South Carolina District 4 0.568 
Ohio District 19 -0.030 South Carolina District 5 -0.027 
Oklahoma District 1 0.568 South Carolina District 6 -0.027 
Oklahoma District 2 0.081 South Dakota District 1 0.135 
Oklahoma District 3 0.297 Tennessee District 1 0.474 
Oklahoma District 4 0.351 Tennessee District 2 0.474 
Oklahoma District 5 0.676 Tennessee District 3 0.158 
Oklahoma District 6 0.273 Tennessee District 4 -0.053 
Oregon District 1 -0.568 Tennessee District 5 -0.263 
Oregon District 2 0.189 Tennessee District 6 -0.263 
Oregon District 3 -0.568 Tennessee District 7 0.474 
Oregon District 4 -0.568 Tennessee District 8 -0.263 
Oregon District 5 -0.297 Tennessee District 9 -0.263 
Pennsylvania District 1 -0.297 Texas District 1 0.211 
Pennsylvania District 2 -0.297 Texas District 2 0.211 
Pennsylvania District 3 -0.135 Texas District 3 0.789 
Pennsylvania District 4 -0.135 Texas District 4 0.211 
Pennsylvania District 5 0.459 Texas District 5 0.421 
Pennsylvania District 6 -0.081 Texas District 6 0.737 
Pennsylvania District 7 0.243 Texas District 7 0.789 
Pennsylvania District 8 0.081 Texas District 8 0.789 
Pennsylvania District 9 0.459 Texas District 9 0.105 
Pennsylvania District 10 0.351 Texas District 10 0.211 
Pennsylvania District 11 -0.297 Texas District 11 0.211 
Pennsylvania District 12 -0.297 Texas District 12 0.421 
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MTurk District Simple Loser % MTurk District Simple Loser % 
Texas District 13 0.579 Washington District 6 -0.778 
Texas District 14 0.526 Washington District 7 -0.778 
Texas District 15 0.053 Washington District 8 0.000 
Texas District 16 0.053 Washington District 9 -0.677 
Texas District 17 0.053 West Virginia District 1 -0.684 
Texas District 18 0.053 West Virginia District 2 -0.421 
Texas District 19 0.737 West Virginia District 3 -0.684 
Texas District 20 0.053 Wisconsin District 1 -0.243 
Texas District 21 0.789 Wisconsin District 2 -0.459 
Texas District 22 0.737 Wisconsin District 3 -0.297 
Texas District 23 0.421 Wisconsin District 4 -0.676 
Texas District 24 0.211 Wisconsin District 5 -0.459 
Texas District 25 0.053 Wisconsin District 6 0.081 
Texas District 26 0.737 Wisconsin District 7 -0.676 
Texas District 27 0.053 Wisconsin District 8 -0.081 
Texas District 28 0.212 Wisconsin District 9 -0.030 
Texas District 29 0.212 Wyoming District 1 0.763 
Texas District 30 0.212 
  Texas District 31 0.714 
  Texas District 32 0.714 
  Utah District 1 1.000 
  Utah District 2 0.514 
  Utah District 3 0.838 
  Vermont District 1 0.136 
  Virginia District 1 0.514 
  Virginia District 2 0.081 
  Virginia District 3 0.027 
  Virginia District 4 -0.027 
  Virginia District 5 -0.081 
  Virginia District 6 0.243 
  Virginia District 7 0.514 
  Virginia District 8 -0.027 
  Virginia District 9 -0.243 
  Virginia District 10 0.514 
  Virginia District 11 0.313 
  Washington District 1 -0.389 
  Washington District 2 -0.611 
  Washington District 3 -0.667 
  Washington District 4 -0.056 
  Washington District 5 -0.333 
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Group NAES Simple Loser % Range Percent of Respondents 
1 -0.7931034 through -.03571429 19.99% 
2 -0.3333333 through -0.1333333 18.98% 
3 -0.1034483 through 0.1071429 21.33% 
4 0.1333333 through 0.3793103 19.62% 
5 0.3928571 through 1.0000000 20.08% 
 
Group NAES Big Loser % Range Percent of Respondents 
1 -0.6551724 through -0.2666667 20.63% 
2 -0.2608696 though -0.1034483 18.00% 
3 -0.1000000 through 0.1000000 22.21% 
4 0.1034483 through 0.3000000 18.68% 
5 0.3103448 through 0.7931034  20.48% 
 
Group MTurk Simple Loser % Range Percent of Respondents 
1 -0.8378378 through -0.2580645 33.65% 
2 -0.2432432 through 0.1842105 30.78% 
3 0.1891892 through 1.0000000 35.57% 
 
Group MTurk Big Loser % Range Percent of Respondents 
1 -0.7105263 through -0.166667 32.38% 
2 -0.0.1621622 through 0.1578947 33.65% 
3 0.1621622 through 0.7837838 33.97% 
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Appendix B 
 
Variable 
NAES 
Variable Range Description 
Register cra01x 0-1 Registered to Vote 
IntendorVotedPrimary crb0311x 0-1 Intend to or Actually Voted in Primary 
IntendGeneral crc0128x 0-1 Intend to vote in general election 
ChanceGeneral crc0228x 0-1 Chance of voting in general election 
ChancePrimary crb0304x 0-1 Chance of Voting among those who have not already 
VotedGeneral crc28xx 0-1 Actual turnout in general election 
FeelCandidates caaab01x 0-1 Strong feelings about candidates 
Ideology cma06x 0-4 Ideology (Very Liberal) 
Partisanship cma123x 0-6 Partisanship (Strong Democrat) 
StrengthPartisanship cma123xx 0-1 Strength of Partisanship 
IdeologicalExtremity cma06xx 0-1 Ideological Extremity 
ImportantVote cre0204x 0-1 Importance attached to voting 
EnjoyVote cre05x 0-1 Enjoy Voting 
StateImportant ckb0204xs 0-1 Motivated by State Politics 
LocalImportant ckb0204xl 0-1 Motivated by Local Politics 
DiscussedPolitics ckb135x 0-1 
Discussed Politics With Family, Friends, at Work, or Online in Past 
Week 
AttentionPolitics cea56713212223x 0-1 Attention to Politics 
FollowPolitics cka01x 0-1 Follow Politics 
PoliticalKnowledge cmc1357x 0-1 Political Knowledge 
PoliticalTrust cmb0102x 0-1 Trust in Government 
PoliticsComplicated cmb10x 0-1 Politics Too Complicated 
NoSayInGovt cmb11x 0-1 People Like Me Have No Say in Government 
PercentLifeAtResidence cwc07x 0-1 Years at Present Address 
   
Age 
Age cwa02x 0-1 Age 
Sex cwa01x 0-1 Sex (Female) 
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Education cwa03x 0-1 Education 
Income cwa04x 0-1 Household Income 
Income_mr 
 
0-1 Houshold Income (with mean) 
Unemployed cwb01xu 0-1 Employment Status (Unemployed) 
Retired cwb01xr 0-1 Employment Status (Retired) 
Student cwb01xs 0-1 Employment Status (Student) 
Worklife cwb01xw 0-1 Employment Status (Worklife) 
ReligiousAttendance cwd01x 0-1 Attend Religious Services 
Married cwf07x 0-1 Marital Status 
Black cwc03xb 0-1 Race (Black) 
Minority cwc03xom 0-1 Race (Other Minority) 
Hispanic cwc01x 0-1 Race (Hispanic) 
Citizenship cwc0405x 0-1 Citizenship 
bigloser bigloser 0-1 Big Loser 
bigwinner bigwinner 0-1 Big Winner 
bigcompete bigcompete 0-1 Big Competitive 
simloser simloser 0-1 Simple Loser 
simwinner simwinner 0-1 Simple Winner 
simcompete simcompete 0-1 Simple Competitive 
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SUBMISSION INFORMATION: 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A Study in Futility: Perpetually Losing Voters in American Elections  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(cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or 
observation of public behavior, unless: (i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that 
human subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) 
any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the 
subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, 
employability, or reputation. 
Note that the study is considered exempt as long as any changes to the use of human subjects 
(including their data) remain within the scope of the exemption category above. Any proposed 
changes that may exceed the scope of this category, or the approval conditions of any other non-
IRB reviewing committees, must be submitted as an amendment through eResearch. 
Although an exemption determination eliminates the need for ongoing IRB review and approval, 
you still have an obligation to understand and abide by generally accepted principles of 
responsible and ethical conduct of research. Examples of these principles can be found in the 
Belmont Report as well as in guidance from professional societies and scientific organizations. 
SUBMITTING AMENDMENTS VIA eRESEARCH:   You can access the online forms for 
amendments in the eResearch workspace for this exempt study, referenced above. 
ACCESSING EXEMPT STUDIES IN eRESEARCH:   Click the "Exempt and Not 
Regulated" tab in your eResearch home workspace to access this exempt study. 
 
Richard Redman 
Chair, IRB HSBS 
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Variable Name Scale Based On 
Registered 0-1 
Q1: These days, many people are so busy they cannot 
find time to register to vote, or they move around so 
often they do not get a chance to re-register. Are you 
currently registered to vote in your precinct or election 
district, or haven’t you been able to register so far? 
Intend 0-1 
Q2: Do you intend to vote in the November election later 
this year?  
Chance 0-1 
0 if Q2==2; Q2_1:What is the percent chance you will 
vote this coming November? 
Vote_2008 0-1 
Q3: In 2008, you may remember that Barack Obama ran 
for President on the Democratic ticket against John 
McCain for the Republicans. Do you remember for sure 
whether or not you voted in that election? 
Vote_2010 0-1 
Q4: In talking to people about elections, we often find 
that a lot of people were not able to vote because they 
weren't registered, they were sick, or they just didn't have 
time. Which of the following statements best describes 
you: 
Vote_five_year (Q5-1)/4 
Q5: In most places around the United States, elections of 
one sort or another take place nearly every year, 
sometimes more than once per year.  Thinking about all 
of the elections (including primaries, caucuses, special 
and recall elections, as well as regular elections) that 
have been held where you live in the last five years (and 
in which you were eligible to vote), in about how many 
of these elections did you vote?   
Past_turnout_scale 0-1 Vote_2008 
  
Vote_2010 
  
Vote_five_year 
Personally_follow_local (Q6_1-1)/4 
Q6_1: How often do you personally follow what is 
happening  in government and politics at each of these 
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three levels? Local 
Personally_follow_state (Q6_2-1)/4 Q6_2 ^ State 
Personally_follow_national (Q6_3-1)/4 Q6_3 ^ National 
Election_affect_issues (Q7-1)/4 
Q7: Some people believe that who wins an election has a 
big impact on policies and conditions in the country. 
Other people believe that, in the end, it doesn’t matter 
much who wins the election, because very little of 
importance changes.  In your opinion, how much do 
election outcomes usually affect what actually happens 
on the issues you care the most about? 
Vote_makes_difference (Q8-1)/4 
Q8: How often have you thought your own vote would 
make the difference in who wins or loses an election? 
Transportation_difficult (Q9-1)/4 
Q9: Typically, how difficult is it for you to find the time 
and transportation to get to your polling locations to 
vote?    
Party_contact_2010 0-1 
Q10: Thinking back to the 2010 elections, did anyone 
from one of the political parties or the candidates' 
campaigns get in touch with you and encourage you to 
vote?  
Other_contact_2010 0-1 
Q11: Did anyone besides the parties or candidates 
encourage you to vote in 2010? 
Party_contact_2012 0-1 
Q12: Now how about this year, has anyone from one of 
the political parties or the candidates' campaigns been in 
touch with you and encouraged you to vote in this year's 
elections? 
Other_contact_2012 0-1 
Q13: Has anyone besides the parties or candidates 
encouraged you to vote in this year's elections? 
Participate_president (5-B1_1)/4 
B1_1: How likely are you to participate in this year’s 
election campaigns, by working to help one of the 
candidate’s campaigns, by donating money to a 
campaign, or by attending a campaign event of some 
kind? President 
Participate_senate (5-B1_2)/4 B1_2 ^ U.S. Senate 
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Participate_house (5-B1_3)/4 B1_3 ^ U.S. House of Representatives 
Participate_governor (5-B1_4)/4 B1_4 ^ Governor 
Participate_legislature (5-B1_5)/4 B1_5 ^ State Legislature 
Participate_judge (5-B1_6)/4 B1_6 ^ State Judge 
Participate_commissioner (5-B1_7)/4 B1_7 ^ County Commissioner or Executive 
Participate_mayor (5-B1_8)/4 B1_8 ^ Mayor or Town Council 
Participate_school (5-B1_9)/4 B1_9 ^ Local School Board 
Participate_ballot (5-B1_10)/4 B1_10 ^ Ballot Initiative/Referendum 
Discuss_family B2_1/8 
B2_1: How many days in the past week did you discuss 
politics with: Family 
Discuss_friends B2_2/8 B2_2 ^ Friends 
Discuss_work B2_3/8 B2_3 ^ Co-Workers 
Discuss_neighbor B2_4/8 B2_4 ^ Neighbors 
Differences_between_parties (3-Q14)/2 
Q14: Do you think there are any important differences in 
what the Republicans and Democrats stand for? 
Time_alone 0-1 
Q15: Do you spend most of your time during the day in 
activities with other adults or do you pretty much work 
on your own most of the time? 
Attend_church (5-Q16)/4 
Q16: How often do you attend religious services, apart 
from special events like weddings and funerals?     
Church_information 0-1 
0 if Q16==5; Q16_1: In past elections, has information 
about candidates, parties, or political issues been made 
available in your place of worship before the election? 
  
Q17: Do you like or dislike the process of going to the 
polls and filling out a ballot?  
Like_process (4-Like_process)/3 
4 if Q17==2; 4 if Q17==3; Q17_1: How strongly do you 
like the process of going to the polls and filling out a 
ballot? 
Dislike_process (4-Dislike_process)/3 
4 if Q17==1; 4 if Q17==2; Q17_2: How strongly do you 
dislike the process of going to the polls and filling out a 
ballot? 
Government_complicated (B3_1-1)/4 B3_1: Sometimes politics and government seem so 
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complicated that a person like me can't really understand 
what is going on. 
Someone_asks_pressure (B3_2-1)/4 
B3_2: When someone I know asks me to vote, I don’t 
feel any added pressure to do so. 
Process_familiar (B3_3-1)/4 
B3_3: The process of going to the polls and filling out a 
ballot is so familiar to me, I feel like I could do it in my 
sleep. 
Miss_dont_care (B3_4-1)/4 
B3_4: If I happen to miss an election, I don’t care if other 
people know I didn’t vote. 
Voting_pointless (B3_5-1)/4 
B3_5: If I know my side will lose the election, I see 
voting as pointless and prefer to find better ways to 
achieve my goals. 
Vote_to_please (B3_6-1)/4 
B3_6: There are times when I turn out to vote mainly to 
please someone I care about. 
  
Q18: For you personally, is voting mainly a duty, mainly 
a choice, or neither a duty nor a choice ? 
Mainly_choice (4-Mainly_choice)/3 
4 if Q18== 1; 4 if Q18==3; Q18_1: How strongly do you 
feel that voting is a choice? 
Mainly_duty (4-Mainly_duty)/3 
4 if Q18==2; 4 if Q18==3 Q18_2: How strongly do you 
feel that voting is a duty? 
Usually_care_local 0-1 
0 if Q19==2; 0 if Q19==3; 0 if Q19==4; Q19: Thinking 
of the different types of elections we have in this country, 
do you usually care the most about elections at the local 
level (e.g., town/city officials, school board, country 
officials), the state level (e.g., governor, state legislature), 
or the national level (e.g., president, Congress). Local 
Usually_care_state 0-1 0 if Q19==1; 0 if Q19==3; 0 if Q19==4; Q19 ^ State 
Usually_care_national 0-1 0 if Q19==1; 0 if Q19==2; 0 if Q19==4; Q19 ^ National 
Care_local (Care_local-1)/4 
1 if Q19==4; Q19_1_1: Now, how much do you usually 
care about what happens in each of these three types of 
elections? Local 
Care_state (Care_state-1)/4 1 if Q19==4; Q19_1_2 ^ State 
Care_national (Care_national-1)/4 1 if Q19==4; Q19_1_3 ^ National 
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Feels_first_time (B4_1-1)/4 
B4_1: Every time a new election comes around, it feels 
like I have to figure out where to go and what to do, 
almost like it’s my first time. 
Embarrassed_no_vote (B4_2-1)/4 
B4_2: I would be embarrassed if my friends, neighbors, 
and co-workers found out I didn't vote. 
Cast_even_losing (B4_3-1)/4 
B4_3: I want to cast my vote and make sure my views 
are counted, even if I know I am on the losing side. 
Never_pressured_people_happy (B4_4-1)/4 
B4_4: I never feel pressured to vote just to make other 
people happy. 
Vote_family_fun (B4_5-1)/4 
B4_5: Going to vote with friends or family members is 
usually more fun. 
Understand_issues (B4_6-1)/4 
B4_6: I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the 
important issues facing our country. 
Donated_money_candidate 0-1 
B5_1: Donated money to a candidate because of the 
position he/she took on an issue that matters to you 
Volunteer_candidate 0-1 
B5_2: Done volunteer work for a candidate because of 
the position he/she took on an issue that matters to you 
Donated_money_group 0-1 
B5_3: Donated money to a group that was supporting a 
political cause you believe in 
Joined_group 0-1 
B5_4: Officially joined an organization that advocated 
your views on a political issue 
Attend_protest 0-1 
B5_5: Attended a protest in support of a specific political 
cause 
Always_vote_important (Q20-1)/4 
Q20: As far as you are concerned personally, how 
important is it to always vote in elections? 
Serve_on_jury 0-1 
Q21: If you were selected to serve on a jury, would you 
be happy to do it or would you rather not serve? 
PartyID 0-6 
Q22: Generally speaking, do you usually think of 
yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an 
Independent? 
  
Q22_1: Do you consider yourself a strong or not a very 
strong Republican? 
  
Q22_2: Do you consider yourself a strong or not a very 
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strong Democrat? 
  
Q22_3: Do you think of yourself as closer to the 
Republican Party or to the Democratic Party? 
Ideological_extremity ((Folded 1-4)-1)/3 
Q23: When it comes to politics, would you describe 
yourself as liberal, conservative, or moderate? 
Battery_ease (9-B6_1)/8 B6_1: Ease (convenience) of getting to the polls 
Battery_affected_outcome (9-B6_2)/8 
B6_2: How much you are likely to be affected by the 
outcome of the election 
Battery_fulfill_duty (9-B6_3)/8 B6_3: Desire to fulfill your civic duty 
Battery_pleasure_line (9-B6_4)/8 
B6_4: Pleasure you get from standing in line and filling 
out a ballot 
Battery_vote_determines (9-B6_5)/8 
B6_5: The likelihood that the election is so close that 
your vote will determine who wins 
Battery_express_support (9-B6_6)/8 
B6_6: Desire to express your support for a candidate or 
cause you strongly believe in 
Battery_family_happy (9-B6_7)/8 
B6_7: Making a friend or family member happy by going 
to vote 
Battery_loyalty (9-B6_8)/8 B6_8: Showing loyalty to your political party 
Battery_encouraged (9-B6_9)/8 B6_9: When candidates or groups encourage you to vote 
Age Q24 Q24: What is your age? 
Years_at_address 0-53 
Q25: How many years have you lived at your present 
address? 
  
Q25_TEXT 
Sex 0-1 Q26: What is your sex? 
Citizen 0-1 Q27: Are you a citizen of the United States? 
Education (Q28-1)/6 
Q28: Which choice best describes the highest level of 
education you've completed? 
Income (Q29-1)/8 
Q29: Last year, what was the total income before taxes of 
all the people living in your household? 
Hispanic 0-1 Q30: Are you of Hispanic ethnicity? 
White 0-1 Q31_1: What is your race? (choose all that apply) White 
Black 0-1 Q31_2 ^ Black 
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Asian 0-1 Q31_3 ^ Asian 
American_Indian 0-1 Q31_4 ^ American Indian 
Other_race 0-1 Q31_5 ^ Other race 
Minority 0-1 Hispanic 
  
Black 
  
Asian 
  
American_Indian 
  
Other_race 
Unemployed 0-1 
Q32: How would you describe your current employment 
status? Unemployed dummy 
Retired 0-1 
Q32: How would you describe your current employment 
status? Retired dummy 
Student 0-1 
Q32: How would you describe your current employment 
status? Student dummy 
Working 0-1 
Q32: How would you describe your current employment 
status? Working full/part time dummy 
Trigger Trigger/100 Trigger_1, Trigger_2, condition 
   Partisanship (Partisanship-1)/3 PartyID 
Percent_life_at_address Percent_life_at_address/23 Years_at_address/Age 
Impact_civic_duty Impact_civic_duty/6 
Q18: For you personally, is voting mainly a duty, mainly 
a choice, or neither a duty nor a choice ? 
  
Q18_1: How strongly do you feel that voting is a choice? 
  
Q18_2: How strongly do you feel that voting is a duty? 
Impact_liking_process 0-6/6 
Q17: Do you like or dislike the process of going to the 
polls and filling out a ballot?  
  
Q17_1: How strongly do you like the process of going to 
the polls and filling out a ballot? 
  
Q17_2: How strongly do you dislike the process of going 
to the polls and filling out a ballot? 
Expressive_activity_index Expressive_activity_index/5 Donated_money_candidate 
  
Volunteer_candidate 
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Donated_money_group 
  
Joined_group 
  
Attend_protest 
Average_national_participation Average_national_participation/3 Participate_president 
  
Participate_senate 
  
Participate_house 
Average_state_participation Average_state_participation/4 Participate_governor 
  
Participate_legislature 
  
Participate_judge 
  
Participate_ballot 
Average_local_participation Average_local_participation/3 Participate_commissioner 
  
Participate_mayor 
  
Participate_school 
Index_of_mobilization 0-5 Party_contact_2010 
  
Party_contact_2012 
  
Other_contact_2010 
  
Other_contact_2012 
  
Church_information 
Follow_state_relative 
Personally_follow_state-
Personally_follow_national 
 
Follow_local_relative 
Personally_follow_local-
Personally_follow_national 
 
State_relative_index -0.8333334 - 0.75 
Average_state_participation, 
Average_national_participation 
Local_relative_index -0.8333334 - 1 
Average_local_participation, 
Average_national_participation 
BLDiv 1-3 Based on Congressional District information from merge 
SLDiv 1-3 Based on Congressional District information from merge 
bigloser 0-1 0 if Partisanship~=. 
  
1 if BLDiv==1 & Partisanship<2.9 
  
1 if BLDiv==3 & Partisanship>3.1 
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bigwinner 0-1 0 if Partisanship~=. 
  
1 if BLDiv==3 & Partisanship<2.9 
  
1 if BLDiv==1 & Partisanship>3.1 
bigcompete 0-1 0 if bigloser==1 | 0 if bigwinner==1 
  
1 if bigloser==0 & bigwinner==0 
simloser 0-1 0 if Partisanship~=. 
  
1 if SLDiv==1 & Partisanship<2.9 
  
1 if SLDiv==3 & Partisanship>3.1 
simwinner 0-1 0 if Partisanship~=. 
  
1 if SLDiv==3 & Partisanship<2.9 
  
1 if SLDiv==1 & Partisanship>3.1 
simcompete 0-1 0 if simloser==1 | 0 if simwinner==1 
  
1 if simloser==0 & simwinner==0 
Feels_first_time_rev (5-B4_1)/4 B4_1 
Never_pressured_people_happy_rev (5-B4_4)/4 B4_4 
Someone_asks_pressure_rev (5-B3_2)/4 B3_2 
Voting_pointless_rev (5-B3_5)/4 B3_5 
Government_complicated_rev (5-B3_1)/4 B3_1 
Elections_matter Elections_matter/3 Differences_between_parties 
  
Election_affect_issues 
  
Vote_makes_difference 
Cost_scale Cost_scale/2 Transportation_difficult 
  
Battery_ease 
Local_elections_scale Local_elections_scale/6 Care_local 
  
Care_state 
  
State_relative_index 
  
Local_relative_index 
  
Follow_state_relative 
  
Follow_local_relative 
Political_discussion Political_discussion/4 Discuss_friends 
  
Discuss_family 
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Discuss_work 
  
Discuss_neighbor 
Civic_duty_scale Civic_duty_scale/3 Impact_civic_duty 
  
Always_vote_important 
  
Mainly_duty 
Social_norms_scale Social_norms_scale/2 Embarrassed_no_vote 
  
Miss_dont_care 
Social_pressures_scale Social_pressures_scale/3 Never_pressured_people_happy_rev 
  
Someone_asks_pressure 
  
Vote_to_please 
Habitual_voting_scale Habitual_voting_scale/2 Feels_first_time_rev 
  
Process_familiar 
Efficacy_scale Efficacy_scale/2 Understand_issues 
  
Government_complicated_rev 
Voice_counted_scale Voice_counted_scale/2 Cast_even_losing 
  
Voting_pointless_rev 
Partisan_commitment_scale Partisan_commitment_scale/3 Battery_loyalty 
  
Ideological_extremity 
  
Partisanship 
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